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3 - Creating Dependence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2021

András Sajó
Affiliation:
Central European University, Budapest
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Summary

“The prevailing force that generates and sustains illiberal power is not tied to specific social and economic conditions. In illiberal democracies, the political shapes society by creating and reinforcing specific mindsets and dependencies. The political and resulting social power of the plebiscitarian leader originates from a system of personal dependencies and from the belief that the leader is indispensable in the permanent chaos. The leader’s political power enables him to set the rules of the game. Illiberal democracies are neopatrimonial regimes, but here personal rule exists hand in hand with a bureaucratic, formal rationalistic system. The ruler pretends not to be above the law, and his state and its officials act as authorized by law.

The plebiscitarian leader operates a patronage system and determines who gets what from the state, but the beneficiary may hold state resources as a prebenda only. With increased state control over social resources individuals become dependent of the state and the leader and autonomous organizations lose their autonomy. This is the material source of power of the leader that enables him to rule in a plebiscitarian democracy.”

Type
Chapter
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Ruling by Cheating
Governance in Illiberal Democracy
, pp. 92 - 111
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • Creating Dependence
  • András Sajó, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: Ruling by Cheating
  • Online publication: 07 August 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996.004
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  • Creating Dependence
  • András Sajó, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: Ruling by Cheating
  • Online publication: 07 August 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Creating Dependence
  • András Sajó, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: Ruling by Cheating
  • Online publication: 07 August 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996.004
Available formats
×