This chapter explains the three core steps in the book’s argument about the power of scarce states. First, I begin by considering the potential for direct effects on society by a scarce state through the distribution of state resources. Second, I suggest that isolated state actions can have effects through a more indirect channel as well. Third, I describe how the societal changes produced – directly or indirectly – by isolated state actions have downstream consequences for who wields political authority and how local actors contest for political power.

This chapter traces the history of the modern state in Northern Ghana. I document state scarcity and explain why it occurred and, only recently, has begun to recede. I then detail the three major actions the modern state still took in the periphery across the colonial and post-colonial periods. he chapter concludes by putting Northern Ghana in comparative perspective, showing how the region’s experience of state scarcity is representative of many hinterlands.

The scarce state’s actions – especially the invention of chieftaincy – have had lasting implications for distributive politics. This chapter connects clientelism to the scarce state’s actions, showing that one particularly large effect of the state on political competition has been through the creation of the community-level brokers that allow parties to engage in clientelism at scale. Clientelism in this hinterland is facilitated most effectively by the chiefs that the state itself created.

This chapter explores how scarce states can also reshape hinterland society indirectly by incentivizing society to change itself. My main focus is a modern-day attempt to invent chieftaincy institutions from scratch among the largest “never recognized” ethnic group, the Konkomba. I track the creation of Konkomba chieftaincy over time, concluding with a theoretical discussion of how the state’s scarcity incentivized Konkomba communities into action.

This chapter provides an introduction to the main argument, evidence, and contributions of the book.

The book’s evidence has implications for scholars of state-building and rural politics, as well as for policymakers concerned with improving state effectiveness in the developing world. I conclude by highlighting three of these implications.

This chapter shows how the modern state’s first two major interventions into society explain the origins of contemporary intra-ethnic inequality in Northern Ghana. The chapter begins by explaining the research design, detailing how the pre-1914 colonial border creates an opportunity to estimate long-run effects of the colonial state’s imposition of new intra-ethnic elites. I then introduce the data and explain how inequality is measured. The analysis first establishes a strong correlation between the invention of chieftaincy and inequality today, comparing the “invented chiefs” and “never recognized” communities. I then explain how the state’s selective provision of education accounts for this relationship. The final section rules out a series of alternative explanations and mechanisms.

Dynastic families in Northern Ghana are widespread, extending decades prior to democratic rule into the colonial era, or earlier. These dynasties connect initial colonial-era chiefs – often installed into their positions directly by the state – to modern elected officeholders. I link Northern Ghana’s dynasties to the first two state interventions described in Chapter 3: the colonial invention of chieftaincy and differential access to education for chiefs’ families.