Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-n9wrp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T19:29:05.422Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

First Chapter - On Vision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2022

David E. Cartwright
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Whitewater
Edward E. Erdmann
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Whitewater
Christopher Janaway
Affiliation:
University of Southampton
Get access

Summary

INTELLECTUAL NATURE OF INTUITION. DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND REASON AND BETWEEN ILLUSION AND ERROR. COGNITION, THE CHARACTER OF ANIMALS. APPLICATION OF ALL THIS TO INTUITION THROUGH THE EYE

All intuition is intellectual. For without the understanding it would never come to intuition, to perception, apprehension of objects; rather, it would remain as mere sensation, which at most could have significance with regard to the will as pain or comfort, but would otherwise be a change of meaningless states and would not be anything similar to a cognition. For intuition, i.e., for cognition of an object first of all requires that the understanding refer any impression that the body receives to its cause, placing this cause in a priori intuited space, as the cause from which the effect proceeds, thus recognizing the cause as acting, as actual, i.e., as a representation of the same type and class as is the body. However, this transition from the effect to the cause is an immediate, vivid, necessary one: since it is a cognition of the pure understanding, it is neither an inference of reason nor a combination of concepts and judgements according to logical laws. Such a thing is the business of reason, which contributes nothing to intuition, but whose object is a completely different class of representations that on earth belongs only to the human race, namely, abstract, non-intuited representations, i.e., concepts; through concepts, however, humans have received their great advantages: language, science, and above all the discretion – only possible through the review of the whole of life – which keeps them independent of the impressions of the moment and makes it possible to act in a deliberate, premeditated, methodical way, whereby their activity is so clearly distinct from that of animals, and the condition for any deliberate choice among multiple motives is met, so that the most complete self-consciousness accompanies the decision of their will. All of this humans owe to concepts, i.e., to reason. Like all abstracta principles, the law of causality, as abstract principle, is, of course, reflection, and thus is an object of reason, but the actual, vivid, immediate, necessary cognition of the law of causality precedes all reflection as it precedes all experience, and it lies in the understanding.

Type
Chapter

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×