Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-fnpn6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-28T04:47:37.065Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Chapter 28 - Characterization of the Will to Life

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2022

Judith Norman
Affiliation:
Trinity University, Texas
Alistair Welchman
Affiliation:
University of Texas, San Antonio
Christopher Janaway
Affiliation:
University of Southampton
Get access

Summary

Our Second Book concludes with the question of the aim and goal of that will that has proven to be the essence in itself of all things in the world. The following remarks will serve to supplement the broader answer we gave there, by describing the general character of that will.

This sort of characterization is possible because we have recognized the inner essence of the world to be something thoroughly actual and empirically given. By contrast, even the name ‘World-Soul’ which is used by some to describe that inner essence, gives a mere entity of reason instead: for ‘soul’ means an individual unity of consciousness that obviously does not accrue to that essence, and quite generally the concept of ‘soul’ is unjustified and therefore useless, because it hypostasizes cognition and willing into an inseparable connection that is thereby independent of the animal organism. The word should only ever be used figuratively because it is by no means as innocent as psuchê or anima, which mean ‘breath’. –

The so-called pantheists however use even less appropriate forms of expression: their whole philosophy consists primarily in calling the inner essence of the world, of which they have no understanding, ‘God’; and they think of this as a great achievement. According to this view, the world would then be a theophany. But cast only one single glance at this world of beings in constant need, continuing to existing for some stretch of time only by eating each other, passing their existence in fear and want and often enduring horrible suffering until finally flinging themselves into the arms of death: whoever keeps this clearly in view will allow that Aristotle is right when he says ‘nature is demonic, not divine’ (On Divination in Sleep, ch. 2, p. 463); indeed, he must admit that a god who would presume to be transformed into such a world reallymust have been plagued by the devil. – I know full well that supposed philosophers of this century emulate Spinoza and think they are justified in doing so. But Spinoza had special reasons for calling his unitary substance ‘God’ so as to salvage at least theword if not the thing.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×