Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew
  • Cited by 21
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2012
Print publication year:
2010
Online ISBN:
9780511750663
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750663
Subjects:
Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Philosophy
Information

Book description

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a collection which examines Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing, showing that it was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings but rather a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. The essays in this 2010 volume open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena of aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy in a new century.

Reviews

'… the articles open a new path of inquiry, one that could not have been opened without the connection to aspect-seeing … the book contains many more successful arguments for seeing Wittgenstein anew.'

Source: Journal of the History of Philosophy

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Page 1 of 2

Contents
  • 1 - Aesthetic Analogies
    pp 23-39
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter discusses examples of visual experience and Wittgenstein's remarks about "seeing-as" in Part II, Section 11 of Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein remains preoccupied with differences among concepts of "seeing" and with philosophy's difference from psychology. Yet questions about capacity of "noticing an aspect", and topics of experience and of interpretation, are central concerns of aesthetics and criticism. The questions about experience or interpretation or noticing an aspect can be found to like questions that we encounter in aesthetics. Wittgenstein also considers general statements about perception or visual experience that we might derive from what we say and do in such cases. Traditional conceptions of form in the visual arts are perfectly analogous to Wittgenstein's examples of seeing-as. Kant's account of form, natural and artificial objects, including works of art, may be judged to be beautiful. His account of aesthetical ideas pertains to beautiful art defined as fine arts nowadays.
  • 2 - Aspects, Sense, and Perception
    pp 40-60
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Contemporary interpretations of phenomenology, as well as current theories of perception, define perception (and seeing) in terms of sense. This chapter brings out certain difficulties for the idea of perceptual sense, difficulties raised by Wittgenstein (and Austin). These difficulties come from the specific point of view of ordinary language philosophy. Talk of perceptual sense takes its start in Frege's notion of sense. This notion was the basis for the so-called Fregean readings of phenomenology. The criticisms in Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, though leveled directly at traditional empiricism, are perhaps even more useful today, now that a whole analysis of perception has been worked out in terms of sense. A phenomenon is not a symptom or a sign of something else that is real: on this point, Wittgenstein and Austin agree. Wittgenstein shows that the myth of seeing as an activity is bound up with a myth of seeing as passivity.
  • 3 - An Allegory of Affinities
    pp 61-80
  • On Seeing a World of Aspects in a Universe of Things
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Wittgenstein speaks more often of the mythological than of the allegorical. The immediate reason for using the word "allegory" to characterize this approach is to recapture something of the concepts and argument in Part IV of The Claim of Reason. Cavell's actual claims on behalf of "the allegory of words" are somewhat modest. What Wittgenstein means by "metaphysics" relentlessly tends to picture the world as a universe of things and their properties, or facts and their arrangements. Wittgenstein suggests a connection between "seeing an aspect" and "experiencing the meaning of a word". Cavell develops these connections in ways no one else foresaw and that have proved difficult to make use of. In insisting on using "aspect", Wittgenstein insists that the intimacy of the world, its affinity for us, is not based on its depth.
  • 4 - The Touch of Words
    pp 81-98
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The principal phenomenon Cora Diamond considers in one of her texts is that of understanding our relation to the non-human world of animals, most extendedly the relation or relations in the mass preparation of animals as food for humans, and she approaches it importantly through her responses to a pair of stories by J. M. Coetzee. Coetzee is careful to have various characters voice their disapproval, to put it mildly, of Costello's comparison of the business of mass animal butchery with the Nazi organization of the gassing and burning of Jews. She says, speaking of her concealed and unconcealed wound, that "it is touched on in every word I speak". A striking idea among Wittgenstein's remarks about seeing aspects is his saying that the importance of the concept lies in its connection with experiencing the meaning of a word and with our attachment to our words.
  • II.1 - Self-Knowledge
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter focuses on the epistemological intuitions that import into the proceedings from the outset expectations about what conditions must be satisfied in order to arrive at a true proposition with self-revelatory content. It highlights that it is easy, when reflecting in a preliminary way about the kind of autobiographical understanding that comes from a grasp of one's past, to conceive of the problem as a polarized epistemological dichotomy. Iris Murdoch emphatically asserts that the past, properly understood, should be "unfrozen", and that one has no less than a moral obligation to "re-think". The chapter further talks about two pole models. In the first one the narrative self is indeed a narrative construction, and in the second one the narrative self is one that is constituted not by present active retrospection but rather by the passive, factually constrained accurate memory of those past episodes of one's life.
  • 6 - The Bodily Root
    pp 120-140
  • Seeing Aspects and Inner Experience
  • View abstract

    Summary

    From the very beginning of his philosophical work, Wittgenstein was concerned with "seeing". This chapter shows that the generalized blindness involved in Frazer's stance and extended by Wittgenstein to the traditional philosophy is a main concern behind the exploration of "seeing aspects". Trapped in the scientific attitude, Frazer assumed that ritual practices result from empirical beliefs or opinions, and so he was unable to see them as any more than superstitions or incipient attempts at science. Wittgenstein argues that Frazer was bound to miss their significance insofar as he attempted to understand and explain them in terms of their external relations of rationality or causality. Wittgenstein's proposal involves change in attitude, deliberate grammatical openness and receptivity to the natural gesturality of language and the underlying, pulsating activity of the body.
  • 7 - (Ef)facing the Soul
    pp 143-161
  • Wittgenstein and Materialism
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Wittgenstein is unrelenting in his attempts to turn us away from an "occult" or "magical" conception of the mind, as a place or realm where meaning happens, where reference is effected, where explanations come to an end not with satisfaction, but out of desperation. This aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy is, of course, what brings upon it the charge of behaviorism, and one reason why Cavell, for example, declares that Wittgenstein's philosophy "takes the risk of apsychism. According to the eliminativist, the conceptual repertoire of folk psychology is a kind of hypothesis concerning the internal workings of human beings. The eliminativist, by casting our ordinary psychological concepts in the role of a theory about the inner workings of the human body (treating joy, for example, as an "inward thing"), denies precisely the kind of transparency Wittgenstein attributes to the face.
  • 8 - Wittgenstein on Aspect-Seeing, the Nature of Discursive Consciousness, and the Experience of Agency
    pp 162-180
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Consciousness or awareness is possessed by a wide range of higher chordates. Genuine discursive consciousness is possessed, at least in its complex forms, only by human beings. Aspect-seeing centrally involves doing something: mastering a technique and acting according to it (or extending it), as a result of "taking to" joint attentional interactions. Wittgenstein's treatment of aspect-seeing offers us a way of thinking about human discursive consciousness that is neither mentalist, nor materialist, nor social constructivist, nor any kind of explanation. It is rather an elucidatory redescription of what we do when we employ concepts within acts of seeing. Wittgenstein is defending both the priority of practice over theoretical representation and the irreducibility of agency to material processes. Neither conceptual practice nor anyone's actively "taking to it" can be reduced to independent and self-subsistent material or mental processes.
  • 9 - The Philosophical Significance of Meaning-Blindness
    pp 183-203
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter explores how Wittgenstein's investigations of aspect-seeing and related topics in Part II, Section 11 of Philosophical Investigations contribute to our understanding of his views on the nature of philosophical conflicts and confusions, of his diagnosis of our "tendency to sublime the logic of our language", and of his own critical methods. In the course of examining the role of images in the perception of aspects, Wittgenstein points out that seeing aspects require a capacity for imagination, for example, for relating the object seen to other objects not currently in view. Wittgenstein, then, delivers no direct answers to the questions we want to pose about meaning-blindness. The meaning-blindness may prove incapable of modifying familiar concepts, or of improvising on novel occasions, or even of making judgments that involve projecting a word with its customary meaning into new, non-stereotypical situations, of seeing new uses as extensions of old ones.
  • 10 - Wanting to Say Something
    pp 204-224
  • Aspect-Blindness and Language
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The mystery of why Wittgenstein takes an interest in the concept of aspect-seeing may be trumped only by the enigma of why he introduces the concept of aspect-blindness. We can find our way with aspect-blindness most easily if we begin by noting what aspect-blindness is not. The experience of having an aspect dawn, or of being struck by something, or of seeing the familiar in a new light, is thus as intimately and pervasively joined to the human form of life as talking. In this chapter, the author suggests that Wittgenstein's interest in the concept of aspect-blindness develops out of a preoccupation (found in Part I of the Investigations) with our attraction to the familiar philosophical ideal of perfect, mutual intelligibility that is the prize we would gain with the "solution" to the problem of meaning.
  • IV.1 - Therapy
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The real difficulty in coming to terms with Wittgenstein's teaching emerges when philosophers turn from talking about that teaching to actually doing philosophy that's supposed to proceed in its light. This chapter illuminates the nature of the difficulty by attending carefully to the way it manifests itself in a recent article by Stephen Mulhall on Wittgenstein's remarks on seeing aspects. It argues that Wittgenstein's remarks are meant to bring us back to, or project us into, situations of speech, or anyway situations in which words are called for particular words whereby we are meant to discover things about the meanings of the words we utter, things that we cannot have failed to know, and yet things that are, for some reason, hard to see. Mulhall's interpretation looks to find in Wittgenstein's remarks a very different kind of satisfaction, or peace, from that which they are designed to enable.
  • 12 - The Work of Wittgenstein's Words
    pp 249-267
  • A Reply to Baz
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter restricts itself to defending the coherence of the author's reading against Avner Baz's critique. There is a structural obstacle in the way of determining exactly what weight to attach to the precise forms and general organization of Wittgenstein's remarks in Part II, Section 11 of Philosophical Investigations, and indeed of the writing that constitutes the whole of that part of the book. Despite the fact that the author's discussion begins by explicitly distinguishing three implications of Wittgenstein's remarks, Baz's summary of it simply runs them together. The strategy of the author's writings on seeing aspects is to reduce our sense of puzzlement about aspect-dawning by relocating it in the broader context of our lives with pictures; that context is hidden from us (and by us) because of its simplicity and familiarity, and it evades our notice precisely because it pervades our form of life.
  • 13 - On the Difficulty of Seeing Aspects and the “Therapeutic” Reading of Wittgenstein
    pp 268-288
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The distinctive character of Wittgenstein's manner of writing, early and late, must play an important role in accounting for the diverse ways in which it has been approached and engaged. When thinking of Wittgenstein on seeing aspects it is natural to think first and primarily of the remarks in Part II, Section 11 of Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein (often) writes in response to a sense that the possibility of various phenomena, for example, meaning, understanding, naming, following a rule, knowing another, has become mysterious to us, and that our efforts to account for their possibility, for example, by supposing underlying mental acts, universals, a pure logical order, only make matters more mysterious. He directs our attention differently to what is evident: the ordinary circumstances of phenomena of which we are aware but which we, for various reasons, dismiss as merely incidental or irrelevant.
  • 14 - Overviews
    pp 291-313
  • What Are They of and What Are They For?
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Wittgenstein's counsel to seek overviews has negative and positive sides. The negative is comparatively straightforward and comprises what Brian Clack refers to as the "prohibition on explanation". The term "synoptic sensibility" refers to the satisfaction taken in overviews, irrespective of any contribution they might make to the explanation of the phenomena of which they afford a perspicuous view. It is obvious that the heuristic rationale does not exhaust the appeal of overviews for Wittgenstein. The case for a synoptic, non-explanatory rationale for Goffman's dealings with presentational phenomena is even stronger than in the case of Wittgenstein's dealings with ritual. The aim of a self-clarificatory overview is to achieve a clearer realization of what it is that constrains the course of our thoughts on certain matters and confers on our recurrent ruminations their distinctive character.
  • 15 - On Being Surprised
    pp 314-337
  • Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Wittgenstein's remarks invoking aspect-perception highlight his overall development as a philosopher. Like Kant, Wittgenstein hoped to reorient the notion of "discovery" as it plays a role in discussions of logic, mathematics, and philosophy, critiquing the idea that the mathematician or philosopher uncovers surprising novel facts and objects. Unlike Kant, Wittgenstein replaces this with the idea that the mathematician allows us to "see the value of a mathematical train of thought in its bringing to light something that surprises us". Wittgenstein therefore points toward the importance of active arrangement of concepts and symbols, open-ended self-discovery, pleasure, and absorbed intuitive preoccupation with diagrams and symbols as ineradicable features of our philosophical, logical, and mathematical activities. There is nothing objectionable per se, on Wittgenstein's view, with relying on pictures, diagrams, and other visible symbolic and representational structures.

Page 1 of 2

References
List of Works Cited
Affeldt, Steven G. “Captivating Pictures and Liberating Language: Freedom as the Achievement of Speech in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.” Philosophical Topics 27 (1999): 255–85.
Affeldt, Steven G. “The Ground of Mutuality: Criteria, Judgment, and Intelligibility in Stephen Mulhall and Stanley Cavell.” European Journal of Philosophy 6 (April 1998): 1–31.
Aldrich, Virgil C. “An Aspect Theory of Mind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March 1966): 313–26.
Aldrich, Virgil C.Philosophy of Art. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
Aristotle. Physics. Edited by Ross, W. D.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936.
Augustine. Confessions. Translated by Outler, Albert C.. Translation revised by Mark Vessey. New York: Barnes and Noble, 2007.
Austin, J. L.How to Do Things with Words. Edited by Urmson, J. O. and Sbisà, Marina. 2d ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Austin, J. L. “The Meaning of a Word.” In Austin, Philosophical Papers, 55–75.
Austin, J. L. “Other Minds.” In Austin, Philosophical Papers, 76–116.
Austin, J. L. “A Plea for Excuses.” In Austin, Philosophical Papers, 175–204.
Austin, J. L.Philosophical Papers. Edited by Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J.. Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Austin, J. L.Sense and Sensibilia. Edited by Warnock, G. J.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
Austin, J. L. “Truth.” In Austin, Philosophical Papers, 117–33.
Austin, J. L., and others. “Discussion générale.” In Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie No. 4, La Philosophie Analytique, 330–80. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1962.
Auxier, Randall E., and Hahn, Lewis Edwin, eds. The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka. Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 30. Chicago: Open Court, 2006.
Baker, Gordon. Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects. Edited by Morris, Katherine. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S.. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
Batkin, Norton. “Formalism in Analytic Aesthetics.” In Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, edited by Kelly, Michael, 2:217–21. 4 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Batkin, Norton. Photography and Philosophy. New York: Garland Publishing, 1990.
Baxandall, Michael. Giotto and the Orators: Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the Discovery of Pictorial Composition 1350–1450. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Baz, Avner. “Seeing Aspects and Philosophical Difficulty.” In The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, edited by McGinn, Marie and Kuusela, Oskari. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Baz, Avner. “What's the Point of Seeing Aspects?” Philosophical Investigations 23 (April 2000): 97–121.
Bearn, Gordon C. F.Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein's Existential Investigations. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Bearn, Gordon C. F. “Wittgenstein and the Uncanny.” Soundings 76, no. 1 (1993): 29–58.
Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.
Blanchot, Maurice. “Thinking the Apocalypse: A Letter from Maurice Blanchot to Catherine David.” Critical Inquiry 15 (Winter 1989): 475–80.
Breithaupt, Fritz, Raatzsch, Richard, and Kremberg, Bettina, eds. Goethe and Wittgenstein: Seeing the World's Unity in Its Variety. Wittgenstein Studien, band 5. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002.
Budd, Malcolm. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. London: Routledge, 1991.
Capek, Karel. Intimate Things. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935.
Cavell, Stanley. “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy.” In Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 86–96.
Cavell, Stanley. “Austin at Criticism.” In Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 97–114.
Cavell, Stanley “The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy.” In Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 44–72.
Cavell, Stanley “The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear.” In Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 267–353.
Cavell, StanleyThe Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Cavell, Stanley “Companionable Thinking.” In Crary, Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, 281–98.
Cavell, Stanley “Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture.” In This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein, 29–75.
Cavell, Stanley “The Division of Talent.” Critical Inquiry 11 (June 1985): 519–38.
Cavell, StanleyIn Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
Cavell, Stanley “The Investigations' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself.” In The Cavell Reader, 369–89. Edited by Mulhall, Stephen. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
Cavell, Stanley “Knowing and Acknowledging.” In Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 238–66.
Cavell, Stanley “Music Discomposed.” In Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, 180–212.
Cavell, StanleyMust We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Cavell, Stanley “Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein's Investigations.” In Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida, 125–86. The Bucknell Lectures in Literary Theory, vol. 12. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Cavell, StanleyPursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Cavell, Stanley “Something Out of the Ordinary.” In Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 7–27. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Cavell, StanleyThis New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein. Albuquerque, N.M.: Living Batch Press, 1989.
Cavell, Stanley “The Wittgensteinian Event.” In Crary and Shieh, Reading Cavell, 8–25.
Cavell, Stanley, Diamond, Cora, McDowell, John, Hacking, Ian, and Wolfe, Cary. Philosophy and Animal Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Churchland, Paul M.Matter and Consciousness. Revised ed. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
Cioffi, Frank. Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience. Chicago: Open Court, 1998.
Cavell, Stanley “The Propaedeutic Delusion.” History of the Human Sciences 13, no. 1 (2000): 109–23.
Cioffi, Frank “Stating the Obvious.” In Erving Goffman, edited by Fine, Gary Alan and Smith, Gregory W. H., Part Four: Methods. 4 vols. Masters in Modern Social Thought Series. London: Sage Publications, 2000.
Cioffi, FrankWittgenstein on Freud and Frazer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Clack, Brian. Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion. New York: Palgrave, 1998.
Coetzee, J. M.Elizabeth Costello. New York: Viking, 2003.
Coetzee, J. M.The Lives of Animals. Edited by Gutmann, Amy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. The Statesman's Manual, 437–8. Edited by Shedd, W. G. T.. New York, 1875. Quoted in Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), 16 n. 29.
Collingwood, R. G.The Principles of Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938.
Conradi, Peter J.Iris Murdoch: A Life. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
Crary, Alice, ed. Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007.
Crary, Alice, and Read, Rupert, eds. The New Wittgenstein. London: Routledge, 2000.
Crary, Alice, and Shieh, Sanford, eds. Reading Cavell. London: Routledge, 2006.
Davidson, Donald. “The Emergence of Thought.” In Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 123–34.
Cavell, Stanley “The Second Person.” In Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 107–21.
Davidson, DonaldSubjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
Day, William. “The Aesthetic Dimension of Wittgenstein's Later Writings.” Unpublished manuscript.
Day, William. “Knowing as Instancing: Jazz Improvisation and Moral Perfectionism.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (Spring 2000): 99–111.
Dennett, Daniel C. “Can Machines Think?” In Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds, 3–29. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.
Dennett, Daniel C.Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1991.
René, Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated. Translated by Cress, Donald A.. 3d ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
Diamond, Cora. “The Hardness of the Soft: Wittgenstein's Early Thought About Skepticism.” In Skepticism in Context, edited by Conant, James and Kern, Andrea. London: Routledge, forthcoming.
Diamond, Cora. The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Diamond, Cora “Rules: Looking in the Right Place.” In Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars, edited by Phillips, D. Z. and Winch, Peter, 12–34. London: Macmillan, 1989.
Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Hall, Harrison, eds. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982.
Drury, M. O'C. “Conversations with Wittgenstein.” In Rhees, Recollections of Wittgenstein, 97–171.
Drury, M. O'C. “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein.” In Rhees, Recollections of Wittgenstein, 76–96.
Drury, M. O'C.The Danger of Words and Writings on Wittgenstein. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996.
Eldridge, Richard. Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
Ellmann, Richard. Four Dubliners: Wilde, Yeats, Joyce, and Beckett. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Society and Solitude.” In Emerson's Complete Works, 7: 9–20. 12 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883.
Engelmann, Paul. Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein: With a Memoir. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
Floyd, Juliet. “Critical Study of Mathieu Marion, Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Philosophy of Mathematics.” Philosophia Mathematica 10, no. 1 (2002): 67–88.
Floyd, Juliet. “Number and Ascriptions of Number in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.” In Future Pasts: Perspectives on the Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy, edited by Floyd, Juliet and Shieh, Sanford, 145–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Floyd, Juliet. “Wittgenstein and the Inexpressible.” In Crary, Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, 177–234.
Floyd, Juliet “Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Shapiro, Stewart, 75–128. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Dagfinn, Føllesdaal. “Husserl's Notion of Noema.” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 680–87.
Dagfinn, Føllesdaal. “Ultimate Justification in Husserl and Wittgenstein.” In Experience and Analysis, edited by Reicher, Maria E. and Marek, Johann C., 127–42. Vienna: öbv & hpt, 2005.
Fodor, Jerry A.The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975.
Frazer, James George. The Golden Bough. Abridged edition. London: Macmillan, 1967.
Freadman, Richard. Threads of Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Frege, Gottlob. “On Sinn and Bedeutung.” In The Frege Reader, 151–71. Edited by Beaney, Michael. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
Galavotti, M. C.Philosophical Introduction to Probability. Stanford: CSLI, 2005.
Genova, Judith. Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing. New York: Routledge, 1995.
Gerrard, Steven. “Wittgenstein's Philosophies of Mathematics.” Synthese 87, no. 1 (1991): 125–42.
Gibson, John, and Huemer, Wolfgang, eds. The Literary Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Glock, Hans-Johann, ed. Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
Glock, Hans-Johann, ed. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
Goffman, Erving. “The Interaction Order.” American Sociological Review 48, no. 1 (February 1983): 1–17.
Goffman, Erving. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1963.
Goldfarb, Warren. “I Want You to Bring Me a Slab: Remarks on the Opening Sections of the Philosophical Investigations.” Synthese 56 (1983): 265–82.
Gould, Timothy. Hearing Things: Voice and Method in the Writing of Stanley Cavell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Gowers, Timothy. Mathematics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Hacker, P. M. S. “Developmental Hypotheses and Perspicuous Representations: Wittgenstein on Frazer's Golden Bough.” In Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, 74–97. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Hacker, P. M. S.Wittgenstein: Mind and Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Hagberg, Garry L.Art As Language: Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Aesthetic Theory. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995.
Hagberg, Garry L. “Autobiographical Consciousness: Wittgenstein, Private Experience, and the ‘Inner Picture’.” In Gibson and Huemer, The Literary Wittgenstein, 228–50.
Hagberg, Garry L. “Davidson, Self-Knowledge, and Autobiographical Writing.” Philosophy and Literature 26:2 (October 2002): 354–68.
Hagberg, Garry L.Meaning and Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Hagberg, Garry L. “The Mind Shown: Wittgenstein, Goethe, and the Question of Person Perception.” In Goethe and Wittgenstein: Seeing the World's Unity in Its Variety, edited by Breithaupt, Fritz, Raatzsch, Richard, and Kremberg, Bettina, 111–26. Wittgenstein Studien, band 5. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002.
Hagberg, Garry L. “On Philosophy as Therapy: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Autobiographical Writing.” Philosophy and Literature 27:1 (April 2003): 196–210.
Hagberg, Garry L. “Rightness Reconsidered: Krausz, Wittgenstein, and the Question of Interpretive Understanding.” In Interpretation and Its Objects: Studies in the Philosophy of Michael Krausz, edited by Ritivoi, Andreea Deciu, 25–37. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003.
Hagberg, Garry L. “The Self, Reflected: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Autobiographical Situation.” In Ordinary Language Criticism: Literary Thinking after Cavell after Wittgenstein, edited by Dauber, Kenneth and Jost, Walter, 171–98. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003.
Hagberg, Garry L. “The Self, Speaking: Wittgenstein, Introspective Utterances, and the Arts of Self-Representation.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, no. 219 (2002): 9–47.
Hagberg, Garry L. “The Self, Thinking: Wittgenstein, Augustine, and the Autobiographical Situation.” In Lewis, Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy, 215–33.
Hagberg, Garry L. “Wittgenstein and the Question of True Self-Interpretation.” In Is There a Single Right Interpretation?, edited by Krausz, Michael, 381–406. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
Hardy, G. H.Apology of a Mathematician. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Harré, Rom. Social Being. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by Macquarrie, John and Robinson, Edward. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
Heidegger, MartinWhat is Called Thinking? Translated by Gray, J. Glenn. New York: Harper, 1968.
Hintikka, Jaakko. “Reply to Marion.” In Auxier and Hahn, The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, 431–36.
Huizinga, Johan. The Waning of The Middle Ages. London: Penguin, 1968.
Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations. Vol. 1. Translated by Findlay, J. N.. London: Routledge, 1970.
Jastrow, Joseph. Fact and Fable in Psychology. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1900.
Johnson, Samuel. The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia (1759). London: Penguin, 1976.
Johnston, Paul. Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner. London: Routledge, 1993.
Joyce, James. “Araby.” In Dubliners. New York: Penguin, 1976.
Kandinski, Wassily. Concerning the Spiritual in Art and Painting in Particular. New York: George Wittenborn, 1912.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Smith, Norman Kemp. London: Macmillan, 1929.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Translated by Bernard, J. H.. New York: Hafner Press, 1951.
Kienzler, Wolfgang. Wittgensteins wende zu seiner Spätphilosophie 1930–1932. Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp Verlag, 1997.
Klagge, James C., ed. Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Krebs, Victor J. “Against Idolatry and Toward Psychology: A Review of Ray Monk's Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius.” The San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal 12, no. 3 (1993): 21–39.
Krebs, Victor J.Del alma y el arte: Reflexiones en torno a la cultura, la imagen y la memoria. Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1997.
Krebs, Victor J. “‘Around the Axis of our Real Need’: On the Ethical Point of Wittgenstein's Philosophy.” European Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 3 (December 2001): 344–74.
Krebs, Victor J. “‘Descending into Primaeval Chaos’: Philosophy, the Body, and the Pygmalionic Impulse.” In Mythos and Logos: How to Regain the Love of Wisdom, edited by Anderson, Albert A., Hicks, Steven V., and Witowski, Lech, 141–60. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004.
Krebs, Victor J. “The Subtle Body of Language and the Lost Sense of Philosophy.” Philosophical Investigations 23, no. 2 (April 2000): 147–55.
Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Kuhn, Thomas S.The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970 – 1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. Edited by Conant, James and Haugeland, John. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry. Translated by McCormick, Edward Allen. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, 1984.
Lewis, C. S.A Grief Observed. London: Faber and Faber, 1961.
Lewis, Peter B., ed. Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Translated by Abbeele, Georges. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
Margalit, Avishai. “Sense and Sensibility: Wittgenstein on the ‘Golden Bough’.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1992): 301–18.
Marion, Mathieu. “Phenomenological Language: Thoughts and Operations in the Tractatus.” In Auxier and Hahn, The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, 413–31.
McDowell, John. Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
McGinn, Colin. “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind 98 (July 1989): 349–66.
McGinn, Marie. Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge, 1997.
McGuinness, Brian. Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers. London: Routledge, 2002.
McGuinness, Brian. “ ‘The Lion Speaks, and We Don't Understand’: Wittgenstein after 100 Years.” In McGuinness, Approaches to Wittgenstein, 3–9.
McGuinness, Brian. “Probability.” In McGuinness, Approaches to Wittgenstein, 201–14.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge, 1999.
Minar, Edward. “Feeling at Home in Language (What Makes Reading Philosophical Investigations Possible?).” Synthese 102 (March 1995): 413–52.
Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: Free Press, 1990.
Moran, Richard. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle, ed. The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.
Mühlholzer, Felix. “Wittgenstein and Surprises in Mathematics.” In Wittgenstein und die Zukunft der Philosophie: Eine Neubewertung nach 50 Jahren. Proceedings of the 24th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: öbv & hpt, 2002.
Mulhall, Stephen. Inheritance and Originality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
Mulhall, Stephen. On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects. London: Routledge, 1990.
Mulhall, Stephen. “Seeing Aspects.” In Glock, Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, 246–67.
Nabokov, Vladimir. Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited. New York: Vintage, 1989. Originally published as Conclusive Evidence. New York: Harper, 1951.
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 (October 1974): 435–50.
Narboux, Jean-Philippe. “Diagramme, Dimensions et Synopsis.” In Théorie, Littérature, Enseignement 22. Saint-Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 2005: 115–41.
Narboux, Jean-Philippe. Dimensions et Paradigms, Wittgenstein et le problème de l'abstraction. Paris: Vrin Mathesis, forthcoming.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.” In The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 139–53. Edited by Geuss, Raymond and Speirs, Ronald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A.. The Meaning of Meaning. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
Orwell, George. “Inside the Whale.” In A Collection of Essays, 210–52. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970.
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Œuvres complètes. Edited by Chevalier, Jacques. Paris: Gallimard, 1954.
Pascal, Fania. “Wittgenstein: A Personal Memoir.” In Rhees, Recollections of Wittgenstein, 12–49.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. “On the Doctrine of Chances, With Later Reflections.” In Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 157–73. Edited by Buchler, Justus. New York: Dover, 1955.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life.” In Reasoning and the Logic of Things, 105–22. Edited by Ketner, Kenneth Laine. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Pippin, Robert B.Idealism as Modernism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Putnam, Hilary. “Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind.” In Putnam, The Threefold Cord, 3–70.
Putnam, Hilary. The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Quine, W. V. “Five Milestones of Empiricism.” In Theories and Things, 67–72. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Rhees, Rush. “Introduction to ‘Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough’.” The Human World 3 (May 1971): 28–41.
Rhees, Rush “Postscript.” In Rhees, ed. Recollections of Wittgenstein, 172–209.
Rhees, Rush “ ‘Seeing’ and ‘Thinking’.” In Rhees, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, 16–26.
Rhees, RushWittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Rhees, Rush “Wittgenstein's Builders.” In Discussions of Wittgenstein, 71–84. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1970.
Rhees, RushWittgenstein's On Certainty: There – Like Our Life. Edited by Phillips, D. Z.. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
Rhees, Rush ed. Recollections of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Rhees, RushPhilosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “On the Origin of Languages.” In Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder: On the Origin of Language, 5–83. Translated by Moran, John H. and Gode, Alexander. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
Sass, Louis A.The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Schulte, Joachim. Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Translated by Schulte, Joachim. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Simmel, Georg. “The Nature of Philosophy.” In Georg Simmel et al., Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics, 283–308. Edited by Wolff, Kurt H.. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965.
Smart, J. J. C. “Materialism.” Essays Metaphysical and Moral: Selected Philosophical Papers, 203–14. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
Smith, Adam. “The History of Astronomy.” In Essays Philosophical and Literary, 342–85. London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1880.
Stendhal. The Charterhouse of Parma. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1958.
Stern, David G.Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Stern, David G.Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction. Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Strawson, P. F.The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: Methuen, 1966.
Strodtbeck, Fred L. “Review of Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior, by Erving Goffman.” The American Journal of Sociology 76, no. 1 (1970): 177–79.
Tolstoy, Leo. War and Peace. Translated by Edmonds, Rosemary. London: Penguin, 1982.
Tomasello, Michael. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Travis, Charles. “Taking Thought.” Mind 109 (2000): 533–57.
Webb, Judson C. “Hintikka on Aristotelian Constructions, Kantian Intuitions, and Peircean Theorems.” In Auxier and Hahn, The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, 195–302.
Whitehead, Alfred North. An Introduction to Mathematics. New York: H. Holt, 1911.
Winch, Peter. Simone Weil: “The Just Balance.”Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Wisdom, John. “Ludwig Wittgenstein 1934–1937.” In Paradox and Discovery, 87–9. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Big Typescript: TS 213. Edited and translated by Luckhardt, C. Grant and Aue, Maximilian A. E.. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Harper, 1958.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Briefwechsel: Mit B. Russell, G. E. Moore, J. M. Keynes, F. P. Ramsey, W. Eccles, P. Engelmann und L. von Ficker. Edited by Seekircher, Monika, McGuinness, Brian, Unterkircher, Anton, Janik, Allan and Methlagl, Walter. CD-ROM. Innsbrucker elektronische Ausgabe, 2004.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Collected Manuscripts of Ludwig Wittgenstein on Facsimile CD-ROM. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. Edited by Wright, G. H.. Translated by Winch, Peter. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value: Revised Edition. Edited by Wright, G. H.. Revised edition of the text by Pichler, Alois. Translated by Winch, Peter. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930–1932, 1936–1937. Edited by Somavilla, Ilse. Innsbruck, Austria: Haymon Verlag, 1997.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1, Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations. Edited by Wright, G. H. and Nyman, Heikki. Translated by Luckhardt, C. G. and Aue, Maximilian A. E.. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 2, The Inner and the Outer, 1949–1951. Edited by Wright, G. H. and Nyman, Heikki. Translated by Luckhardt, C. G. and Aue, Maximilian A. E.. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Notebooks 1914–1916. Edited by Wright, G. H. and Anscombe, G. E. M.. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M. and Wright, G. H.. Translated by Paul, Denis and Anscombe, G. E. M.. New York: Harper, 1969.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Grammar. Edited by Rhees, Rush. Translated by Kenny, Anthony. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M. and Rhees, Rush. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. 2d ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M. and Rhees, Rush. Revised English translation by Anscombe, G. E. M.. 3d ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Edited by Hacker, P. M. S. and Schulte, Joachim. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M., Hacker, P. M. S., and Schulte, Joachim. Rev. 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2009.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Occasions: 1912–1951. Edited by Klagge, James and Nordmann, Alfred. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Remarks. Edited by Rhees, Rush. Translated by Hargreaves, Raymond and White, Roger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on Colour. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M.. Translated by McAlister, Linda L. and Schättle, Margarete. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Edited by Wright, G. H., Rhees, R., and Anscombe, G. E. M.. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. Revised ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M. and Wright, G. H.. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 2. Edited by Wright, G. H. and Nyman, Heikki. Translated by Luckhardt, C. G. and Aue, M. A. E.. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by Pears, D. F. and McGuinness, B. F.. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1961.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann. Edited by McGuinness, Brian. Translated by Schulte, Joachim and McGuinness, Brian. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930–1932: From the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee. Edited by Lee, Desmond. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932–1935: From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald. Edited by Ambrose, Alice. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939. Edited by Diamond, Cora. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Zettel. Edited by Anscombe, G. E. M. and Wright, G. H.. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
Wollheim, Richard. Art and Its Objects: An Introduction to Aesthetics. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Wollheim, Richard. On Formalism and its Kinds. Barcelona: Fundació Antoni Tàpies, 1995.
Wollheim, RichardPainting as an Art. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
Wollheim, RichardThe Thread of Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Wright, G. H. von. “The Troubled History of Part II of the Investigations.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 42 (1992): 181–92.
Wright, G. H. von.Wittgenstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.