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Chapter 8 - A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation”(with P. Oppenheim)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

1. The Problem. The concept of confirmation of a hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, that is, unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question. And second, the acceptance or rejection of a sentence which does represent an empirical hypothesis is determined, in scientific procedure, by the degree to which it is confirmed by relevant evidence.

The preceding remarks, however, are meant only as accounts of methodological tendencies and are not intended to imply the existence of clear-cut criteria by means of which the scientist can decide whether – or, in quantitative terms, to what degree – a given hypothesis is confirmed by certain data. For indeed, no general and objective criteria of this kind are at present available; in other words, no general definition of the concept of confirmation has been developed so far. This is a remarkable fact in view of the importance of the concept concerned, and the question naturally suggests itself whether it is at all possible to set up adequate general criteria of confirmation, or whether it may not rather be necessary to leave the decision in matters of confirmation to the intuitive appraisal of the scientist.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

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