The theory of affect proposed here is not in itself a complete theory of either motivation or psychodynamics. Such a theory must include an explication of the enduring configurations of motives (i.e., of set-goals, mismatches, and other cognitive-affective schemas), as well as an examination of the way an individual carries out these motives in an environmental context and resolves conflicts between various wishes, ideals, mismatches, prohibitions, and affects.

I will now propose such a model and in so doing will utilize the metaphor of psychic “structure.” Different theorists in the social sciences have used this term, and in order to avoid ambiguity I will define “structure” at the outset as referring to constellations of functionally related processes. This view is probably closest to the psychoanalytic notion of structure embodied in Freud's structural model, though I have defined the term as above to avoid the kind of reification of structures that has plagued psychoanalytic theory. As many writers, both within and without psychoanalysis have pointed out, psychic structures are repeatedly concretized in psychoanalytic literature, often treated as organs instead of constructs.

Though some of his disciples have carried this practice to extremes (reifying drives as well), Freud was often guilty of this himself, which has caused a popular misconception that Freud posited a set of homunculi within the brain. Psychoanalytic writers often speak of “the ego” as experiencing anxiety or depression, when it is the person, not the ego, who is anxious or depressed (see Mendelson's [1974] criticism of Bibring's otherwise excellent paper on depression, 1953). Reification is not, however, inherent in a structural approach.