Introduction

An examination of Western philosophical and psychological perspectives on the self reveals that the self can be viewed as a soul, an underlying substrate, an activity, an explanatory hypothesis, a cognitive structure, a verbal activity, an experience, a process, or a normative attainment (Levin, 1992, pp. 204–205). These various perspectives on “the” self present a problem for a unitary view of the self, but in fact the variety is even greater than this. According to some, multiple selves are simultaneously present in dissociative phenomena such as hypnosis or multiple personality disorder (E. Hilgard, 1986/1991), as well as in the play and exploration of young children (Wolf, 1990). According to others, the notion of multiple selves should not be taken literally, either because it stops us from recognizing that a single “person” is in control (Elster, 1986) or because it reifies what are actually only “parts” of a mythical unit (Orne & Bauer-Manley, 1991). Although many agree that there is a distinct number of types or aspects of self, they disagree as to the exact number: Self is viewed as single (Gallup, 1985), double (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), triple (Freud, 1923/1962; Lichtenberg, 1975; Schafer, 1968), quadruple (Stern, 1985), quintuple (Neisser, 1988), septuple (Stern, 1985, p. 7), or octuple (Allport, 1961).