Since Richard Dawkins first proposed his meme theory in 1976 there have been a number of attempts to develop and defend it, as well as some rather misplaced criticisms. In this chapter and the next, I explore several such commentaries. Chapter 9 focuses largely on the issue of imitation, as discussed by Susan Blackmore, Dan Sperber, Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson. Here I examine two of the best-known applications of memetics: Dawkins's own attempt to embrace viruses within the cultural side of the analogy, and Daniel Dennett's claim – one of the most significant that has been made for the potency of meme theory – that memetics can explain the emergence of human consciousness.

Richard Dawkins

Richard Dawkins has speculated about the extent to which a certain type of cultural replicator might be seen more as the analogue of a virus than of a gene. Famously, as an example of this sort of replicator he uses religion, and concludes that it “is best understood as an infectious disease of the mind”. This analysis he uses to add weight to his already well-publicized conviction that truth is incompatible with religion, for it implies that large sections of the human race are even now devoting themselves, not to the service of God, but to the propagation of a virus. Since Dawkins regards biological evolution as an alternative to God, it is perhaps not surprising that he should also use his theory of cultural evolution to explain away religious belief.