‘Conventional’ and ‘ultimate truth’

The argument so far, and what follows

I said in the Introduction that the form of this book results from my approach to two classic problems in the study of Buddhism. Of the first, the doctrine of anattā, I have now completed my account. In discussing it, I have had occasion to refer, at many times and at crucial moments, to the second problem, ‘Buddhism and Society’ – conceived in terms of my particular concern, of how the dimension of social and individual differentiation within Buddhist culture is perceived by, and how it affects, the intellectual products of its textual tradition. This problem will now become increasingly important in the second half of the book, Parts III and iv, in which I shall discuss the Theravāda conception of the person, of personal identity and continuity (both in its general form and in the particular case of rebirth).

The dimension of ‘Buddhism and Society’ will enter into my account in various ways, as elements both of the Theravāda material and of my interpretative grasp of it. In the first place, there is the meta-linguistic dichotomy between ‘conventional’ truth (sammuti-sacca, Sanskrit samvrti–Satya) and ‘ultimate’ truth (paramattha-sacca, Sanskrit paramārtha-satya).