Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on Official Documents
- Abbreviations
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense
- Part One A War is Generated
- Part Two Cold War Togetherness
- Part Three The First Victim of War
- Part Four Rallying Round Self-Defense
- Part Five War Without Limit?
- 16 War by Mistake
- 17 Defending in Advance
- 18 A New Doctrine of Preventive War
- Part Six Peace Sidelined
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
16 - War by Mistake
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on Official Documents
- Abbreviations
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense
- Part One A War is Generated
- Part Two Cold War Togetherness
- Part Three The First Victim of War
- Part Four Rallying Round Self-Defense
- Part Five War Without Limit?
- 16 War by Mistake
- 17 Defending in Advance
- 18 A New Doctrine of Preventive War
- Part Six Peace Sidelined
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
If Egypt was not about to attack, that fact would seem to be fatal to an anticipatory self-defense argument for Israel. Allan Gerson thought it “may or may not be true” that Egypt was about to strike, and he went from that agnosticism, as we saw in Chapter 6, to base an argument in Israel's favor on Egypt's shipping restrictions. But the shipping restrictions argument gained little traction among analysts and came to be downplayed by the government of Israel itself. As we saw in Chapter 6, it was an argument with major weaknesses.
Several writers who, like Gerson, found themselves unable to say that Egypt was going to attack stayed nonetheless with a self-defense analysis. Even if Egypt was not about to attack, they said, the government of Israel thought that Egypt would attack, and this belief kept Israel's invasion of Egypt within the bounds of lawful self-defense.
This argument, it must be stressed, has never been made by the government of Israel, which insisted and still insists that Egypt truly was about to attack. In 1988, however, two writers did make this argument. Yoram Dinstein, as we saw, said that the appraisal of the situation in 1967 by the Israeli leadership may have been inaccurate. But what matters, said Dinstein, is what Israel believed: “Invocation of the right of self-defence must be weighed on the basis of the information available (and reasonably interpreted) at the moment of action, without the benefit of post factum wisdom. In the circumstances, as perceived in June 1967, Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow . . . but was entitled to resort to self-defence as soon as possible.” It sufficed, ran Dinstein’s argument, that Israel “expected” an attack, even if its expectation did not accord with reality.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-DefenseQuestioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War, pp. 141 - 148Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012