INTRODUCTION

In the run-up to the withdrawal of NATO-led troops—scheduled for the end of 2014-prices for illegal arms in Afghanistan have soared dramatically. The price for an AK-47 rifle tripled during 2012. As an Afghan civilian explained, ‘People are saying security will collapse, or soldiers will join warlords or the Taliban, so we need something to protect our families when there's a crisis’ (Petty, 2012).

The prices of illicit firearms and their relation to security dynamics have attracted interest among journalists and researchers for some time. In Afghanistan, for example, the recent price increase spurred speculation that the security situation in the country would soon deteriorate. Analysts also argue that prices provide an indication of arms availability, ‘demonstrating whether or not they can be easily obtained’ (Karp, 2002, p. 65). Statistical analysis has even suggested that lower Kalashnikov rifle prices lead to an increased risk of civil war (Killicoat, 2007, p. 258).

Despite continued coverage of arms prices, analysis has been constrained by the difficulties inherent in gathering information from illicit markets. Most research has relied on second-hand data, often prices quoted in media reports. The fact that data collectors generally cover different locations and periods of time—while speaking to different sources— further hampers the comparability of the data. Information on prices for illicitly sold ammunition is particularly scarce.