In the introduction I offered a brief characterisation of an intuitive notion of human social action, contrasting it with notions of nonsocial action – especially natural (individual and interpersonal) action. In this chapter I will consider some of the prevailing theoretical – especially philosophical – approaches to social action. I do so primarily for the purpose of locating my own approach in the larger philosophical context; I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive picture of theories of social action, nor will I seek to provide a complete defence of my own favoured teleological account of social action. In addition, I will briefly introduce the various different species of social action, and related normative phenomena, that are the basic subject matter of this book.

SOCIAL POWER AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

As will be evident by now, the underlying conception of social action that informs this book is that of cooperative individual actions directed to (collective) ends. The model on offer is what might be termed a teleological cooperation model. Such a model stands in contrast with ones that emphasise social conflict and social power. Let me consider a social power model before looking at the contrasting social cooperation model that I wish to advocate.

There is a recent and widespread tendency among social theorists – perhaps more often sociologists than philosophers – to define, in effect, all human action as the exercise of power.