Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Series Editor's Introduction
- Preface
- 1 Taking Responsibility
- 2 Social Welfare as a Collective Social Responsibility
- 2.1 The Policy Context
- 2.2 Some Key Words in Context
- 2.3 Collective Responsibility
- 2.4 The Classic Case for Collectivization Restated
- 2.5 The Morality of Incentives and Deterrence
- 2.6 The Point of Politics
- References
- Index
2.1 - The Policy Context
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Series Editor's Introduction
- Preface
- 1 Taking Responsibility
- 2 Social Welfare as a Collective Social Responsibility
- 2.1 The Policy Context
- 2.2 Some Key Words in Context
- 2.3 Collective Responsibility
- 2.4 The Classic Case for Collectivization Restated
- 2.5 The Morality of Incentives and Deterrence
- 2.6 The Point of Politics
- References
- Index
Summary
Some philosophical debates cannot be fully appreciated outside their larger social contexts. On the face of it, it is hard to see how there can be much argument over the desirability of people's taking responsibility for the well-being of themselves and their families. We ordinarily do so more or less automatically and unreflectively. We almost invariably agree that it is good that we should do so.
But that of course is not what the argument is about. Unquestionably, behaving responsibly is a virtue. Those who take responsibility for the welfare of themselves and their families, particularly when times are tough, unquestionably deserve high praise. The question is merely what to do about people who are unable or unwilling to assume responsibility in this way.
Clearly, those who abnegate responsibility for the welfare of themselves and their families have behaved badly – if they reasonably and realistically could have done otherwise. But questions of who could have done what, and how we (or even they) could ever tell, are far from transparent. Many of the more vexing issues here are less factual than counterfactual, posing “what if?” questions that are by nature inherently indeterminate.
Furthermore, statements about your personal responsibilities are first and foremost statements about what you should do. Nothing necessarily follows from those propositions as to what others should do, if you fail to do what you should have done.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility , pp. 99 - 115Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998