Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Early Defectors, 1924–1930
- 2 Yezhovshchina-Era Defectors, 1937–1940
- 3 World War II-Era Defectors, 1941–1946
- 4 Early Cold War Defectors, 1947–1951
- 5 Post-Stalin Purge Defectors, 1953–1954
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Organisational Changes in Soviet Intelligence and State Security, 1918–1954
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Post-Stalin Purge Defectors, 1953–1954
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 October 2020
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Early Defectors, 1924–1930
- 2 Yezhovshchina-Era Defectors, 1937–1940
- 3 World War II-Era Defectors, 1941–1946
- 4 Early Cold War Defectors, 1947–1951
- 5 Post-Stalin Purge Defectors, 1953–1954
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Organisational Changes in Soviet Intelligence and State Security, 1918–1954
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The Post-Stalin Purge group represents a surge of defectors– ten in a thirteen-month period– some of which were the most widely publicised cases of the twentieth century. The defectors in this group broke with the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in March 1953, and equally significantly, six of them defected after Beriya's execution in December 1953. Beriya's arrest in June sent shock waves through the Soviet state security establishment and brought back memories of the 1930s, when purges followed the series of transitions from one state security chief to another. Beriya's arrest and later execution, along with the disappearances of Beriya's supporters, left officers jittery. The typically ominous occasion of a recall to Moscow caused panic, prompting some officers to escape rather than face an anticipated purge. This group ends with the stabilisation of the post-Beriya Soviet state security establishment and the passing of the purge threat.
By 1953, Britain and the United States had institutionalised their processes for handling and exploiting defectors, and both countries’ national security leaders recognised defectors as a valuable asset. For example, a quick succession of four defectors in January–February 1954 was a topic of discussion at a US National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 17 February 1954. The four, who were referred to as ‘Beriya men’, included one in Tokyo, who effectively wrecked the Soviet apparatus in Japan; another who led to the exposure of the MVD network in Norway; and two in Vienna– a lieutenant colonel and a civilian. The defector in Tokyo was a clear reference to Rastvorov and the defector in Norway was Pavlov, who, although he had defected six months earlier, had more recently come into US custody. The NSC meeting occurred only two days after Deryabin's defection in Vienna, and although he was a major, not a lieutenant colonel, that reference was certainly to him. The civilian in Vienna was likely Anatoliy Ignatiyevich Skachkov, a non-intelligence officer whose defection Deryabin was investigating when he decided to defect himself. The NSC meeting was a prominent venue for discussing specific defectors.
However, the Post-Stalin Purge group was a brief anomaly in an otherwise waning flow of Soviet defectors, similar to the plummet in the number of defectors that occurred after 1930, and for equivalent reasons.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Soviet DefectorsRevelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924–1954, pp. 214 - 262Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2020