In contrast to the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, which evoked a wave of speculation in both the US and its associated countries about an allegedly inevitable collapse of the global American alliance system, the pre- and post-Geneva period of the Afghanistan negotiations have seen a paucity of such speculation in the media of the countries that are the subject of this chapter. Direct consideration of the implications of the withdrawal has apparently been a taboo topic for the Soviet media and, evidently, for the media of its alliance partners as well, although there have been nuances of difference, as we shall see later on.

The approach of this chapter is first to present certain background factors of a theoretical and contextual nature; next, to distinguish among the various classes of Soviet alliance partners; and finally to look at the differential impact that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan may have on the respective types of allies. Gorbachev's ‘new political thinking’ is presumably informed by a general desire to ‘wipe the slate clean’ in dealing with the outside world so as to maximise opportunities to pursue a more cost-effective set of policies at home and abroad in keeping with his perceptions of the structure and behaviour appropriate for a modern superpower in the age of the ‘scientific and technical revolution’. Bringing that desire to fruition is not an easy task, however, because of the structures, commitments and ideological presuppositions relating to Soviet foreign policy in general and the Soviet alliance system in particular which Gorbachev has inherited from his predecessors. Not even Gorbachev himself can be considered an entirely free agent in such matters.