Devouts and Good Frenchmen

Louis XIII decided, in the fall of 1627, that he would personally supervise the critical siege of La Rochelle. He mustered a large army, about 30,000 men, and ordered the nobility of the nearby provinces of Guyenne and Poitou to meet him in front of the city. The governor of Poitou, the duke of la Rochefoucauld, arrived with a contingent of 1,500 mounted nobles; dismounting in front of the king, la Rochefoucauld told Louis that “there is not one of these men who is not my relative.” Shortly thereafter, Louis replaced him as governor.

Here, in a single incident, we have a summary of the basic problems facing the French state in the 1620s. The governor of a relatively small province is able, on four days' notice, to raise a private army of 1,500 mounted nobles, all of whom are his client-relatives. La Rochefoucauld's feat was hardly atypical: in 1621, the duke of Epernon, governor of Guyenne, raised a similar number of nobles for a campaign against Béarn; the duke of la Trémoille once raised 3,000 men in 24 hours. The grandees (grands) regularly traveled with armed noble entourages of 100 to 300 men; they had military clients throughout their governorships, although the southern provinces tended to have rival factions rather than one coherent clientage network. One can imagine the effect upon the deputies of the estates of Brittany of the arrival of the duke of Rohan and his 150 mounted clients or of the baron of Pontchâteau and his armed 100.