From the 1970s, there was a rise in piety among Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia. Scholars attributed this phenomenon to the Islamic resurgence movement, which strived to strengthen Islam in all aspects of life (Chandra, 1987, p. 2). During this period, Suharto was already Indonesia's president, and Malaysia was under the leaderships of Abdul Razak Hussein (1971- 1976) and Hussein Onn (1976-1981). By the time Mahathir was appointed as Malaysia's prime minister in 1981, the Islamic resurgence movement had grown greatly in size and influence.

One of the strategies adopted by Suharto and Mahathir in dealing with the rise of piety among their citizens was to systematically co-opt ulama and Muslim intellectuals into state-sponsored institutions in order to contain and draw the Muslim resurgence movement to their political cause. The two leaders feared that the ulama and the intellectuals could attract a mass following, galvanising Islamic political parties to challenge the government. They were also concerned that the movement's demands, which included an Islamic state and shariah laws among other things, could create dangerous tensions in Indonesia's and Malaysia's multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. The movements were so vocal and organised that Suharto and Mahathir did concede to some aspects of their demands. They initiated major Islamic policies such as establishing Islamic banks, building mosques, elevating the status of Islamic courts, passing shariah-based statutes, and creating the ulama institutions discussed in the previous chapter.

Another reason why Suharto and Mahathir co-opted the ulama and intellectuals was to manage intra-religious divisions in their respective societies. Muslims in Indonesia were in part split between the traditionalists (represented mainly by NU) and modernists (represented largely by Muhammadiyah), with the former being more hostile towards Suharto's agenda. Traditionalists regard Suharto's policies as dividing them. As will be discussed shortly, on the one hand, Suharto primarily designed his cooptation strategy to contain NU. On the other hand, Malaysia in the 1980s witnessed a growing number of ulama inclined to Islamist ideas.