Book contents
- Stealth Lobbying
- Stealth Lobbying
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Identifying the Hidden Influence of Lobbyists in Public Policymaking
- 2 Scheduling Influence and Buying Access
- 3 The Strategic Behavior of Individual Lobbyists and Their PACs
- 4 Stealth Fundraising and Legislative Favors
- 5 Stealth Lobbying, Stealth Contributions, and the Affordable Care Act
- 6 Conclusions about Money in Politics
- References
- Index
2 - Scheduling Influence and Buying Access
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 July 2022
- Stealth Lobbying
- Stealth Lobbying
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Identifying the Hidden Influence of Lobbyists in Public Policymaking
- 2 Scheduling Influence and Buying Access
- 3 The Strategic Behavior of Individual Lobbyists and Their PACs
- 4 Stealth Fundraising and Legislative Favors
- 5 Stealth Lobbying, Stealth Contributions, and the Affordable Care Act
- 6 Conclusions about Money in Politics
- References
- Index
Summary
How Members of Congress spend their time on a daily basis is a consequential decision for American public policies. It is also, interestingly, the decision over which Members have the most control (Fenno 1978; Hall and Wayman 1990). Members decide, whether consciously or unconsciously, how much of their time to grant to lobbyists – and which lobbyists.
In this chapter, I specify the conditions that make it more or less likely that Members will meet with lobbyists. I use the daily schedules of a diverse array of Members of Congress to explain how Members allocate their time across the many demands placed on them.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Stealth LobbyingInterest Group Influence and Health Care Reform, pp. 27 - 59Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022