Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Abbreviations used in Notes
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part One Nineteenth-century Developments
- Part Two Amalgamation, Diversification and Rationalisation, 1903–39
- 8 Multi-plant Operations and Managerial Difficulties, 1900–14
- 9 Problems of Commercial Integration: Fairfield's and Coventry Ordnance Works
- 10 Birkenhead Operations from 1903 to World War I
- 11 World War I and the Post-war Boom: The Impact on Steel of High Activity, Plant Expansion and New Technology
- 12 Shipbuilding, 1914–29
- 13 Economic Depression and the Steel Trade in the 1920s
- 14 Cammell Laird Rolling Stock
- 15 Amalgamation and Rationalisation: The Formation and Early Development of the ESC
- 16 Economic Efficiency and Social Costs: The Closure of the Penistone Works
- 17 Reconstruction and Recovery at the ESC, 1932–39
- 18 Shipbuilding in the Great Depression and the 1930s
- Part Three Culmination and Decline, 1940–93
- Bibliography
- Index
13 - Economic Depression and the Steel Trade in the 1920s
from Part Two - Amalgamation, Diversification and Rationalisation, 1903–39
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Abbreviations used in Notes
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part One Nineteenth-century Developments
- Part Two Amalgamation, Diversification and Rationalisation, 1903–39
- 8 Multi-plant Operations and Managerial Difficulties, 1900–14
- 9 Problems of Commercial Integration: Fairfield's and Coventry Ordnance Works
- 10 Birkenhead Operations from 1903 to World War I
- 11 World War I and the Post-war Boom: The Impact on Steel of High Activity, Plant Expansion and New Technology
- 12 Shipbuilding, 1914–29
- 13 Economic Depression and the Steel Trade in the 1920s
- 14 Cammell Laird Rolling Stock
- 15 Amalgamation and Rationalisation: The Formation and Early Development of the ESC
- 16 Economic Efficiency and Social Costs: The Closure of the Penistone Works
- 17 Reconstruction and Recovery at the ESC, 1932–39
- 18 Shipbuilding in the Great Depression and the 1930s
- Part Three Culmination and Decline, 1940–93
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In the aftermath of wartime destruction there seemed good reason to hope for a new era in steel and for profitable use of the four million ton national extension of capacity. The newly installed plant was believed to be much more efficient than that in the older works. For a time results seemed to justify the expectations. Production faltered and then boomed. In 1920, though lower than in 1917 or 1918, it was 1.3 million tons, or 18.3 per cent higher than in 1913, by far the best ever pre-war year. Sheffield fully shared the optimism of the times. An observer in 1920 looked back to its recent industrial experiences and forward with high hopes:
It has shaken it up in a way that nothing else would have done, and with its modern shops, modern methods and resources of output almost double those of pre-war days, it is now well on its way to enjoy the fruits of the biggest boom the world of steel has ever known.
In fact there was a rapid collapse and for many years UK firms proved unable to compete effectively for the work that was available. As a result in the five years to 1925 UK steel output averaged only 6.7 million tons, or more than 12 per cent below the 1913 figure. After the disastrous conditions of 1926 conditions improved, the average output of 1927–29 being 9.1 million tons, well in excess of the 1913 figure. However there was surplus capacity, costs were high, prices were keen and many operations were unprofitable.
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- Information
- Steel, Ships and MenCammell Laird, 1824-1993, pp. 201 - 209Publisher: Liverpool University PressPrint publication year: 1998