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17 - The Bossano Strategy (January–February 1989)

Peter Gold
Affiliation:
University of the West of England
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Summary

There was certainly a positive note in the statements which emerged from the Spanish Foreign Ministry on 1 January 1989, and some good reasons for such a note to be struck. First, Joe Bossano—his reputation already established in Spain as more hard-line than his predecessor—had proposed a second visit to the Campo region on 10 January to continue with discussion of areas of cooperation, a move which was seen as both ‘possible and desirable’ by the Palacio de Santa Cruz. Second, it was felt that following the visits of Prime Minister Thatcher and Queen Elizabeth, there was a new climate which would lead to the British Government putting pressure on Gibraltar regarding joint use of the airport. Third, the new line from the Spanish Foreign Ministry was to present a ‘softer image’; an example was the Spanish Government's willingness not to create difficulties over land reclamation developments in the port area of Gibraltar Bay, on which it was planned to build some 1,200 dwellings. And finally, Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was due to meet his counterpart on 6 February in their annual round of talks, had a new adviser on Gibraltar in the form of Richard Gozney, until recently a member of the British diplomatic mission in Madrid, and therefore seen in Spain as someone who understood the Spanish approach to the Gibraltar problem.

However, before the glow became too rosy, on 4 January the Municipal Council in Algeciras accused Gibraltar of contributing to dangerous pollution in the Bay of Algeciras through the disposal of solid waste in the sea.

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A Stone in Spain's Shoe
The Search for a Solution to the Problem of Gibraltar
, pp. 150 - 158
Publisher: Liverpool University Press
Print publication year: 1994

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