Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. The Fate of Young Democracies
  • Cited by 65
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2012
Print publication year:
2008
Online ISBN:
9780511817809
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817809
Subjects:
Law, Comparative Law, Political Economy, Politics and International Relations
Information

Book description

The recent backlash against democracy in such countries as Bolivia, Venezuela, Russia, and Georgia poses renewed concerns about the viability of this regime type in the developing world. Drawing on a unique data set of every democratization episode since 1960, this book explores the underlying reasons for backsliding and reversal in the world's fledgling democracies and offers some proposals with respect to what the international community might do to help these states stay on track toward political stability. Rejecting earlier scholarship on this topic, Kapstein and Converse argue that the core of the problem is found in the weak institutions that have been built in much of the developing world, which encourage leaders to abuse their power. Understanding the underlying reasons for democratic failure is essential if we are to offer policy recommendations that have any hope of making a difference on the ground.

Reviews

"The Fate of Young Democracies is timely and intensely relevant. Though the challenges confronting young democracies have long occupied political scientistsand economists, this is the first book to analyze them systematically. The authors reach a conclusion that is of utmost importance for both students and those in the professional community who are concerned with development and support for democratic institutions: the incentives of elected officials to pursue public policies in the public interest must play a central role in any assessment of democratic consolidation."
--Philip Keefer, Lead Economist, Development Research Group, The World Bank

"A timely and provocative argument that challenges common wisdoms in the academic world and sends a clear message to policy-makers as well. A must-read for anyone interested in democratization and democracy promotion."
--Nancy Bermeo, Nuffield Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Oxford

"Kapstein and Converse have issued a wake-up call to political leaders who tout the attributes of democratic change, but who then fail to invest the resources to make the transformation sustainable. This work presents empirical evidence that democracy is not a sure path to prosperity, even if it remains the best governance choice in the long term. We Americans should continue to support democratic development, but Kapstein and Converse warn that our approach should be grounded in an awareness that democracy in the developing world, where strong political and economic institutions are often absent, is highly susceptible to failure."
--J. Brian Atwood, Dean, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota

"Kapstein and Converse offer a rich course of data and theory on democratic transitions and reversals since 1960. They demolish old simplifications and insist we dig deeper to understand the institutional foundations of both pluralist politics and sustained economic growth. They find that new democracies are at high risk, yet show that certain policies are more likely to bring success. Policy professionals and students of democracy alike will change their thinking after reading this insightful work."
--Jack Goldstone, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

"Examines the role of democracy in promoting long-run political stability and economic growth, focusing on the differences between young democracies that manage to consolidate their regimes and those that backslide or revert to authoritarianism..."
--Journal of Economic Literature

"...For academics, the study presents a wealth of opportunities for new research. For current or prospective policymakers, the book provides powerful food for thought on how best to administer foreign aid or direct the influence of an international organization. The Fate of Young Democracies lays the groundwork for a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing democratization efforts around the globe."
--Harvard Law Review

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, and Robinson, James A.. 2005. Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. Handbook of Economic Growth. Eds. Aghion, Philippe and Durlauf, Stephen. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James. 2006. Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Adsera, Alicia, and Boix, Carles. 2004. Constitutional Engineering and the Stability of Democracies. Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics. Tucson, Arizona, September 30–October 3, 2004.
Aizenman, Joshua, and Marion, Nancy. 1999. Volatility and Investment: Interpreting Evidence from Developing Countries. Economica 66: 157–79.
Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio, and Wacziarg, Romain. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8: 155–94.
Alesina, Alberto, and Roubini, Nouriel with Cohen, Gerald. 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Allcott, Hunt, Lederman, Daniel, and López, Ramón. 2006. Political Institutions, Inequality, and Agricultural Growth: The Public Expenditure Connection. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3902. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Allison, Graham T., and Beschel, Robert. 1992. Can the United States Promote Democracy?Political Science Quarterly 107(1): 81–98.
Bardhan, Pranab, and Yang, Tsung-Tao. 2004. Political Competition in Economic Perspective. BREAD Working Paper 78. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Beck, Thorsten, and Laeven, Luc. 2005. Institution Building and Growth in Transition Economies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3657. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Bernhard, Michael, Reenock, Christopher, and Nordstrom, Timothy. 2001. Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival. Journal of Politics 63(3): 775–803.
Bernhard, Michael, Reenock, Christopher, and Nordstrom, Timothy. 2003. Economic Performance and Democratic Survival in New Democracies: Is There a Honeymoon?Comparative Political Studies 36(4): 404–31.
Bertrand, Jacques. 1998. Growth and Democracy in Southeast Asia. Comparative Politics 30(3): 355–75.
Bienen, Henry, and Herbst, Jeffrey. 1996. The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa. Comparative Politics 29(2):23–42.
Block, Steven A. 2002. Elections, Electoral Competitiveness, and Political Budget Cycles in Developing Countries. Harvard University Center for International Development Working Paper 78. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Block, Steven, A. 2005. Counting the Investor Vote: Political Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Bond Spreads in Developing Countries. Journal of International Business Studies 36(1): 62–88.
Block, Steven A., Ferree, Karen E., and Singh, Smita. 2003. Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections, and Political Business Cycles in Africa. Journal of African Economies 12(3): 444–68.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M and, Jones, Bradford S.. 2004. Event History Modelling: A Guide for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brender, Adi, and Drazen, Allan. 2004. Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Economies. NBER Working Paper 10539. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Pereira, Bresser, Carlos, Luis, Maravall, José Maria, and Przeworski, Adam. 1993. Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bruce, John. 1996. Country Profiles of Land Tenure, Africa. Madison, WI: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph M., and Morrow, James D.. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bunce, Valerie. 2001. Democratization and Economic Reform. Annual Review of Political Science 4: 43–65.
Byman, Daniel L., and Pollack, Kenneth M.. 2003. Democracy in Iraq?The Washington Quarterly 26(3): 119–36.
Carbone, Giovanni M. 2003. Developing Multi-Party Politics: Stability and Change in Ghana and Mozambique. Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers No. 36 (November). London: London School of Economics.
Carothers, Thomas. 1999. Aiding Democracy Abroad. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Carothers, Thomas. 2004. Political Party Aid: Issues for Reflection and Discussion. Unpublished Memorandum for the Swedish International Development Agency.
Carothers, Thomas. 2006. Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Carothers, Thomas. 2007. A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy. Journal of Democracy 18(1): 112–18.
Case, William F. 2001. Thai Democracy, 2001: Out of Equilibrium. Asian Survey 41(3): 525–47.
Centeno, Miguel Angel. 1994. Between Rocky Democracies and Hard Markets: Dilemmas of the Double Transition. Annual Review of Sociology 20: 125–47.
Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 2006. Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems. American Political Science Review 100(3): 353–68.
Clemens, Michael, Kenny, Charles, and Moss, Todd. 2004. The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success. Center for Global Development Working Paper 40. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
Collins, Wilkie. (1868/1998). The Moonstone. London: Penguin Classics.
Soto, Hernando. 2003. The Mystery of Capital. New York: Basic Books.
Dethier, Jean-Jacques, Ghanem, Hafez, and Zoli, Edda. 1999. Does Democracy Facilitate the Economic Transition? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2194. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Diamond, Jared. 2001. Guns, Germs and Steel. New York: W. W. Norton.
Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, Larry. 2005. Democracy, Development and Good Governance: The Inseparable Links. Annual Democracy and Governance Lecture. Accra, Ghana: Center for Democratic Development.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harpers.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Edwards, Sebastian. 1991. The Macroeconomics of Populism. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Eds. Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Drazen, Allan. 2001. The Political Economy of Macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Easterly, William, and Levine, Ross. 1997. Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(4): 1203–50.
,Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. 2006. Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean. Santiago: Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Leblang, David. 2006. Democracy and Globalization. NBER Working Paper 12450. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Elkins, Zachary, and Simmons, Beth. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. American Political Science Review 98(1): 171–89.
Elster, Jon. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order. Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, David L., Bates, Robert, Goldstone, Jack, Kristensen, Ida, and O'Halloran, Sharyn. 2006. Democratic Transitions. American Journal of Political Science 50(3): 551–69.
Fidrmuc, Jan. 2001. Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the Wheels of Growth? EIB Papers 6: 24–40.
Field, Erica and Torero, Maximo. 2006. Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program. Mimeo, Harvard University.
Finkel, Steven, Perez-Linan, Anabel, and Seligson, Mitchell. 2006. Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Final Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development.
Fish, M. Steven. 2001. The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion. Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy. Eds. Anderson, Richard D., Fish, M. Steven, Hanson, Stephen E., and Roeder, Philip G.. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frank, Thomas. 2004. What's the Matter with Kansas?New York: Henry Holt.
Galiani, Sebastian, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto. 2006. Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling. Universidad Torcuato di Tella Business School Working Paper 06/2005. Buenos Aires: Universidad Torcuato di Tella.
Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Power, Timothy J.. 1998. Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World. Comparative Political Studies 30(2): 123–55.
Gerring, John, Bond, Philip, Barndt, William T., and Moreno, Carola. 2005. Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective. World Politics 57: 323–64.
Glaeser, Edward, Porta, Raphael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, and Shleifer, Andrei. 2004. Do Institutions Cause Growth?Journal of Economic Growth 9: 271–304.
Goldstein, Markus, and Udry, Christopher. 2005. The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana. Yale University Economic Growth Center Working Paper 929. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
Gradstein, Mark. 2005. Democracy, Property Rights, Redistribution and Economic Growth. Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper DP5130. London: Center for Economic Policy Research.
Greif, Avner, and Laitin, David. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. American Political Science Review 98(4): 633–52.
Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Guillaume, Dominique, and Stasavage, David. 1999. Making and Breaking Monetary Policy Rules: The Experience of African Countries. Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper 99-2. Oxford: Oxford University.
Haggard, Stephan, and Kaufman, Robert. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hellman, Joel. 1998. Winner Takes All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transition. World Politics 50: 203–34.
Higley, John, and Burton, Michael G.. 1989. The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns. American Sociological Review 54(1): 17–32.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Jackman, Robert W. 1986. Elections and the Democratic Class Struggle. World Politics 39(1): 123–46.
Kaplan, Stephen. 2006. Do Elections Hurt Developing Economies? Unpublished Manuscript.
Kapstein, Ethan B. 2004. Behavioral Foundations of Democracy and Development. Center for Global Development Working Paper 52. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
Kapstein, Ethan B. 2006. Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kapstein, Ethan B., and Milanovic, Branko. 2003. Income and Influence: Social Policy in Emerging Market Economies. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute.
Keefer, Philip. 2004. A Review of the Political Economy of Governance. 2004. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3315. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Keefer, Philip. 2005. Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3594. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Keefer, Philip. 2007a. The Political Economy of Development. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Eds. Boix, Carles and Stokes, Susan C.. New York: Oxford University Press.
Keefer, Philip. 2007b. Clientelism, Credibility and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 804–21.
Keefer, Philip, and Khemani, Stuti. 2005. Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services. The World Bank Research Observer 20(1): 1–27
Keefer, Philip, and Stasavage, David. 2003. The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. American Political Science Review 97(3): 407–23.
Knack, Steven. 2000. Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? IRIS Center Working Paper 238. College Park: University of Maryland.
Kopstein, Jeffrey. 2003. Post-Communist Democracy: Legacies and Outcomes. Comparative Politics 35(2): 231–50.
Kopstein, Jeffrey. 2006. The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion. The Washington Quarterly 29(2): 85–98.
Krieckhaus, Jonathan. 2006. Democracy and Economic Growth: How Regional Context Influences Regime Effects. British Journal of Political Science 36: 317–40.
Lake, David, and Baum, Matthew. 2001. The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services. Comparative Political Studies 34(6): 587–621.
Lancaster, Carol. 2007. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lancaster, Carol, and Dusen, Ann. 2005. Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Landa, Dimitri, and Kapstein, Ethan B.. 2001. Inequality, Growth and Democracy. World Politics 53(2): 264–96.
Larrabee, F. Stephen. 2006. Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe. Foreign Affairs 85(6): 117–31.
Lee, Junhan. 2002. Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional Myths. Asian Survey 42(6): 821–37.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy. American Political Science Review 53(1): 69–105.
Lopez-Cordova, J. Ernesto, and Meissner, Christopher. 2005. The Globalization of Trade and Democracy, 1870–2000. NBER Working Paper 11117. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mandela, Nelson. 2002. No Easy Walk to Freedom. London: Penguin Classics.
Mansfield, Edward, and Pevehouse, Jon C.. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations. International Organization 60(1): 137–67.
Maravall, Jose Maria. 1995. The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage. Economic Reform and Democracy. Eds. Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F.. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Marshall, Monty G., and Jaggers, Keith. 2005. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transactions, 1800–2002. University of Maryland, www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity. Accessed on 15 September 2007.
Mello, Luiz, and Tiongson, Erwin R.. 2006. Income Inequality and Redistributive Government Spending. Public Finance Review 34(3): 282–305.
Meltzer, Allan, and Richard, Scott. 1981. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 914–27.
Milanovic, Branko. 2005. Relationship between Income and Democracy Re-examined, 1820–2000: A Non-Parametric Approach. Mimeo, World Bank.
Munck, Geraldo L., and Verkuilen, Jay. 2002. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices. Comparative Political Studies 35(1): 5–34.
Nelson, Joan M. 1995. Linkages between Politics and Economics. Economic Reform and Democracy. Eds. Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F.. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Papaioannou, Elias, and Siourounis, Gregorios. 2004. Democratization and Growth. London Business School Working Paper. London: London Business School.
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. 2006. Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change. NBER Working Paper 12175. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56(3): 515–49.
Plümper, Thomas, and Martin, Christopher. 2004. Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect. Public Choice 117(1–2): 27–50.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rabello de Castro, Roberto, and Ronci, Marcio. 1991. Sixty Years of Populism in Brazil. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Eds. Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Radelet, Steven. 2003. Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
Rais, Rasul B. 1988. Pakistan in 1987: Transition to Democracy. Asian Survey 28(2): 126–36.
Ramey, G., and Ramey, V.A.. 1995. Cross-Country Evidence on the Link between Volatility and Growth. American Economic Review 85: 1138–51.
Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. The Beijing Consensus. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
Rao, Vaman. 1984. Democracy and Economic Development. Studies in Comparative International Development 19(4): 67–81.
Remmer, Karen. 1993. Political Economy of Elections in Latin America. American Political Science Review 87: 393–407.
Rigobon, Roberto, and Rodrik, Dani. 2004. Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the Interrelationships. NBER Working Paper 10750. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 2002. Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence. Review of Development Economics 6(2): 225–47.
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses. Journal of Economic Growth 4(4): 385–412.
Rodrik, Dani. 2000. Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability. American Economic Review 90(2): 140–44.
Rodrik, Dani, and Wacziarg, Romain. 2005. Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?American Economic Review 95(2): 50–5.
Rose, Gideon. 2000/2001. Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay. International Security 25(3): 186–203.
Rueda, David. 2001. Political Parties and Economic Policy in Industrialized Democracies: An Insider–Outsider Partisanship Model. Presented at the Conference on the Comparative Political Economy of Developed and Less Developed Countries. Yale University Center for International and Area Studies, May 4–5, 2001.
Russett, Bruce. 1964. Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics. World Politics 16(3): 442–54.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 1989. Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America. NBER Working Paper 2897. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Shanker, Satyanath, and Subramanian, Arvind. 2004. What Determines Long-Run Macroeconomic Stability? Democratic Institutions. IMF Working Paper 04/215. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Schuknecht, Ludger. 1996. Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Countries. Kyklos 49: 155–70.
Sen, Amartya. 1994. Poverty and Famines. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sender, John. 1999. Africa's Economic Performance: Limitations of the Current Consensus. Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(3): 89–114.
Stewart, Frances. 2002. Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper 81. Oxford: Oxford University.
Svensson, Jakob. 1999. Aid, Growth and Democracy. Economics and Politics 11(3): 275–97.
Svolik, Milan. 2007. Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation. Unpublished Working Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champagne.
Tavares, José, and Wacziarg, Romain. 2001. How Democracy Affects Growth. European Economic Review 45(8): 1341–79.
Tay, Simon S.C., and Hwee, Yeo Lay. 2006. Elections in Asia: Making Democracy Work. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish.
Tilly, Charles. 2003. Inequality, Democratization and De-Democratization. Sociological Theory 21(1): 37–43.
Tilly, Charles. 2007. Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
,University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). 2006. Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set. utip.gov.utexas.edu Accessed on 20 August 2006.
Walle, Nicholas. 1999. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wacziarg, Romain T., and Welch, Karen Horn. 2003. Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence. NBER Working Paper 10152. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weyland, Kurt. 1998. Swallowing the Bitter Pill. Comparative Political Studies 31(5): 539–68.
Weyland, Kurt. 1999. Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics 31(4): 379–401.
Weyland, Kurt. 2002. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weyland, Kurt. 2003. Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much Affinity?Third World Quarterly 24(6): 1095–115.
Williamson, John, and Haggard, Stephan. 1994. The Political Conditions of Economic Reform. The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Ed. Williamson, J.. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
,World Bank. 2005. Economic Growth in the 1990s. New York: Oxford University Press.
,World Bank. 2006. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 2005. www.worldbank.org.
World Development Indicators (WDI). 2006. www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2005.
Wright, Joseph. 2008. Political Competition and Democratic Stability in New Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 38: 221–45.
Yang, David. 2006. The Persisting Poverty of Strategic Analysis in U.S. Democracy Assistance Abroad. Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States. Eds. Birdsall, Nancy, Vaishav, Milan, and Ayres, Robert L.. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.