Although the six essays that comprise the present collection may differ widely in approach, they are all animated by a shared belief in the possibility and in the importance of a theory of contract law that aims to be comprehensive in scope and normative in character. They are intended as contributions to the ongoing elaboration of such a theory. All the essays have been specifically prepared for this volume and appear now for the first time in print. In keeping with the goals of the Cambridge Law and Philosophy Series, the contributors have been encouraged to present their ideas and arguments in as fully developed and detailed a manner as possible. Each essay stands on its own as a sustained effort to explore a distinct theoretical point of view via an engagement with specific aspects of the law of contract. Before introducing the contents of the individual essays, however, I should say something about prior theoretical discussions that form their immediate intellectual backdrop. The following remarks are necessarily brief and selective.

In the twentieth century, it may be fairly said that theoretical writing about the common law of contract is inaugurated by one piece: Lon L. Fuller's 1936 article “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.” It is only a slight exaggeration to say that all subsequent efforts either take up and elaborate lines of argument suggested by this essay or attempt to forge an alternative approach in response to it.