Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-sjtt6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-03T19:38:00.607Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Control, privacy, and individuality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Stephen R. Munzer
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
Get access

Summary

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EXCLUDABILITY

The preceding discussion of property and personality leaves at least two loose ends regarding personal characteristics and situations. It does not pursue things besides personality that property might affect. Nor does it relate property to economic organization. This chapter tries to rectify these shortcomings.

The discussion steers between two extremes and establishes an intermediate position. It rejects, on the one hand, the extreme view that private property is necessary to achieve the personal goods of control, privacy, and individuality, and that achieving them offers a powerful justification for private property. The discussion also rejects, on the other hand, the extreme view that private property has but a tenuous relation to these “goods,” which, because they reflect either weird or “bourgeois” values, can hardly provide much of an argument for private property anyway. The chapter secures instead an intermediate position: Important connections exist between private property and control, privacy, and individuality. These connections hardly demonstrate that strong private-property rights are essential to a satisfactory society. But they do indicate that private property does some good things – though exactly which things, and how much good, varies from one economic system to another. The argument for this intermediate position is not a boring compromise. For it casts doubt on laissez faire capitalism, repels the suggestion that charitable donations or welfare benefits can cure the evils of economic inequality, links property rights in certain economies to self-respect and self-esteem, and introduces the concepts of minimal and appropriately equal property holdings that will play key roles in Chapter 9.

Type
Chapter
Information
A Theory of Property , pp. 88 - 119
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1990

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×