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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Daniel F. Spulber
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
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The Theory of the Firm
Microeconomics with Endogenous Entrepreneurs, Firms, Markets, and Organizations
, pp. 465 - 502
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • References
  • Daniel F. Spulber, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: The Theory of the Firm
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819902.015
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  • Daniel F. Spulber, Northwestern University, Illinois
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  • Book: The Theory of the Firm
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