Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- PART ONE
- CHAPTER ONE The positivist bias: a philosophical assumption which accounts for the dearth of normative theory in the discipline of international relations
- CHAPTER TWO Sceptical and realist arguments against normative theory in international relations: a critical appraisal
- PART TWO
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
CHAPTER TWO - Sceptical and realist arguments against normative theory in international relations: a critical appraisal
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- PART ONE
- CHAPTER ONE The positivist bias: a philosophical assumption which accounts for the dearth of normative theory in the discipline of international relations
- CHAPTER TWO Sceptical and realist arguments against normative theory in international relations: a critical appraisal
- PART TWO
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed in some detail the general positivist bias of much international relations theory as one of the main reasons for the lack of normative political theory in the discipline. I showed how positivism, and the fact/value dichotomy on which it rests, has come under serious attack in the philosophy of the social sciences and I showed how the main thrust of that attack indicates that it is not possible to do social science without to some extent becoming involved in arguments about the substantive issues in normative political theory. But this positivist bias of the discipline is only a partial explanation for the poverty of theory in this field. It is the aim of the present chapter to look at certain other common assumptions held by theorists in international relations which prevent their taking normative theory seriously. In particular I shall examine certain pervasive assumptions regarding the nature, status and use of substantive value judgements and moral theory in international relations.
There can be little doubt that most scholars in the field of international relations do consider substantive moral arguments and normative theory to be not a worthwhile endeavour and to be suspect in certain ways. If asked to give reasons for their scepticism with regard to normative argument and theorizing, the answer would most likely be something akin to the following. Such theories are soft in that they fail to take account of the realities of international relations.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Towards a Normative Theory of International RelationsA Critical Analysis of the Philosophical and Methodological Assumptions in the Discipline with Proposals Towards a Substantive Normative Theory, pp. 42 - 78Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1986