A NAVAL FLEET relied on its supplies; navies, like armies, moved in aaccordance with their stomachs. A naval ship could expect to carry four months of provisions in its hold; its ability to maintain operational effectiveness depended on its receiving further supplies. In other words, the quantity of food and water on board a ship directly dictated its ability to remain at sea: while it was adequately supplied, it was able to pursue its objectives. Without adequate food and water though, ships were forced to return to port, abandoning their operations. In 1703 the secretary of the Admiralty, Josiah Burchett, made a clear connection between victualling success and his government's strategic designs. Victualling delays and shortages severely impacted on the navy's ability to project power. Over the ensuing century, this was a recurring problem. As the navy increased in size, and its commitments became increasingly far-flung, the relationship between supply and seapower was repeatedly tested. As the British Empire grew and its global commitments increased, so did the pressure on the victualling service. Responsibility fell into the hands of the British naval administration, tasked with improving the logistical arrangements that shaped naval power. As these administrative systems improved, so did the operational possibilities available to the Royal Navy.