The 1980s and 1990s constituted a new critical juncture in Latin American politics. Changes in the international economy, the exhaustion of statist economic models, and evolving class structures limited the viability of economic policies and political coalitions that had once predominated in the region, and new policy agendas and coalitions moved from the margins to the center of the political stage. As the ISI model entered into a terminal crisis, the labor-mobilizing parties that for decades had been the “fulcrum” of party systems in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (Collier and Collier 1991: 40) were confronted with a fundamental challenge. The increased political and economic difficulties associated with traditional statist policies and the diminishing benefits associated with union support created a strong incentive for these parties to change course. For governing labor-based parties, the costs of nonadaptation were potentially very high: Failed strategies could lead to profound economic crisis and party collapse. The parties did not bear these costs alone. Where Latin American labor-based parties failed in the 1980s and 1990s, party systems often fragmented and decomposed, and some democratic regimes weakened and even broke down. Thus, labor-based party adaptation was critical not only to the political success of the parties themselves, but also to the performance and stability of democratic regimes.

This book has examined the capacity of labor-based parties to adapt to the opportunities and constraints posed by changing electoral and economic environments.