Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vsgnj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-25T02:17:25.462Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

6 - Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Richard Rorty
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Get access

Summary

Robert Brandom's Making It Explicit and John McDowell's Mind and World were both published in 1994. Both books help us see the overlap between the views of two important recent critics of empiricism – Wilfrid Sellars and Donald Davidson. These two philosophers never discussed each other's work, but they complement one another beautifully.

Though they share indebtedness to Sellars and Davidson, the two books differ dramatically. Brandom helps us to tell a story about our knowledge of objects diat makes almost no reference to experience. He does not so much criticize empiricism as assume that Sellars has disposed of it. The term “experience” does not occur in the admirably complete index to Brandom's 700-page book; it is simply not one of his words.

By contrast, McDowell's book tries to defend empiricism against Sellars and Davidson – conceding most of their premises but dissenting from their conclusions. Brandom can be read as carrying through on “the linguistic turn” by restating pragmatism in a form that makes James's and Dewey's talk of experience entirely obsolete. McDowell can be read as arguing that pragmatists should not be allowed to banish the term “experience” from philosophy, because the price of such disappearance is much greater than Sellars, Davidson, or Brandom realizes.

The possibility of such disappearance raises the question of the place of British empiricism in the history of philosophy. The American pragmatists have usually been viewed as belonging to the same empiricist tradition to which the so-called logical empiricism of Russell, Carnap, and Ayer also belongs. The pragmatists’ version of empiricism has seemed, to many historians of philosophy, to differ from others simply by being less atomistic in its description of the perceptual given.

Type
Chapter
Information
Truth and Progress
Philosophical Papers
, pp. 122 - 137
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×