Reviewing the progress of African democratisation in 2001, Herbst (2001: 359) pointed out the difficulty analysts face in characterising the situation in most countries, as some democratic forms have no content and, in some instances, democratic content is found outside of the expected forms. This difficulty persists as we seek to draw together the central lessons from our case studies. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests that our case-study countries can be classified into three broad categories:

1. (i) countries in which democratisation is progressing, albeit with some problems (Ghana and South Africa);

2. (ii) intermediate countries in which the democratic form is functioning, but is beset by major problems (Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia and Mozambique); and

3. (iii) countries with a distinct authoritarian or militaristic drift, despite the enactment of democratic forms and rituals (Rwanda, Burundi and Zimbabwe).

Such an evaluation tilts our case studies on the side of the pessimists. Addressing the outcomes of African democratisation in this classificatory way, however, may shift our attention away from our emphasis on democratisation as a process. An emphasis on process dictates that we look at the ways in which democratic institutions and practices are built or undermined, and the norms and values through which such actions are legitimated. This process-tracing puts the emphasis on trajectories and avoids the static conception implicit in outcomes.

In this Conclusion, we explore the processes in our case-study countries using the comparative method. In the first set of comparisons, we compare our country pairs, for example Nigeria and Ghana, in order to explore similarities and differences.