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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2009
There is a class of moral virtues that either doesn't require that the agent know that what she is doing is right or, worse, that actually requires that the agent be ignorant. These virtues I am calling the ‘virtues of ignorance.’ This class includes modesty, blind charity, impulsive courage, and a species of forgiveness, as well as of trust. In this chapter I will be discussing these virtues and alluding to the problems they pose for standard views of virtue, particularly the Aristotelian theory discussed in the previous chapter. I will take modesty as my paradigm case of this type of virtue.
MODESTY
“My dear Watson, … I cannot agree with those who rank modesty among the virtues. To the logician all things should be seen exactly as they are, and to underestimate one's self is as much a departure from truth as to exaggerate one's own powers.” (Sherlock Holmes, from “The Greek Interpreter” by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle)
‘Modesty’ has at least two senses. There is the sexual sense of modesty, usually considered a womanly virtue, which primarily consists in a chaste and unassertive countenance. There is also the more usual sense that is associated with self-deprecation or an underestimation of one's selfworth. It is this latter sense that concerns me in this chapter. And the previous quotation encapsulates a good deal of what I want to say about this sense of ‘modesty.’
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