The August 2003 berthing of an American warship—the USS Iwo Jima—off the coast of Monrovia was greeted with huge expectations of a much-needed American presence, expectations held by Liberians and international public opinion. The optimistic expectation of a positive and perhaps decisive American military intervention parallels the United Kingdom's deployment of special forces in neighboring Sierra Leone three years earlier. However, the expectations and optimism proved unfounded, given the limited nature of the deployment (if any), the perceived or real short-term nature of active American intervention, and the continued practice of subcontracting the leadership role (especially in military terms) to less capable African states. Yet this singular event in August 2003 challenges us to reexamine the nature, scope, and commitment of the United States to conflict and security management in West Africa, especially in the post–September 11, 2001, era.

Underlying any analysis of the American role in conflict and security management in West Africa are certain historical, political, and military dynamics. Prior to 2001, the American role in conflict management in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), including West Africa, was shaped by Cold War dynamics and a colonial legacy under which American ideological and strategic interests were subordinated by and contracted to European allies—the United Kingdom (UK) and France. This engendered a policy of minimal or avoidable military engagement in conflict management, except in the case of U.S. intervention in Somalia, whose outcome further diminished the already tenuous rating of Africa in the American strategic calculus, and also compounded the skepticism about the potential of American active military intervention in conflict management in Africa.