Utilitarian schemes for state intervention to promote the common good are opposed not only by libertarians opposed to state intervention as a matter of principle but also by deontologists opposed to the utilitarian fixation with good outcomes. What matters much more to them are individuals' motives and intentions. It is not enough, for them, that the right thing be done. They also insist that it be done, and be seen to be done, for the right reasons.

Thus, for example, deontological moralists and social critics under their sway are anxious to know whether we are sending food to starving Africans out of genuinely altruistic concern or merely to clear domestic commodity markets, for one particularly topical example. Or, for another example, critics of the Brandt Commission's plea for increased foreign aid more generally say, in stinging rebuke: “Many of those who support the proposal … do so out of genuine humanitarian concern about … poverty. But it is doubtful whether this is the main concern of its authors, and it certainly is not their only concern. … They are, instead, primarily concerned with the preservation of the existing world economic order.”

What is common to all such cases is an attempt at motive differentiation. Any particular piece of behavior might have sprung from any of a number of different underlying motives; commentators (moralists, social critics) want to know which was the real motive.