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  3. Values in Science
  • Cited by 23
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2022
Print publication year:
2022
Online ISBN:
9781009052597
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009052597
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
Series:
Elements in the Philosophy of Science
Information

Book description

This Element introduces the philosophical literature on values in science by examining four questions: (1) How do values influence science? (2) Should we actively incorporate values in science? (3) How can we manage values in science responsibly? (4) What are some next steps for those who want to help promote responsible roles for values in science? It explores arguments for and against the “value-free ideal” for science (i.e., the notion that values should be excluded from scientific reasoning) and concludes that it should be rejected. Nonetheless, this does not mean that value influences are always acceptable. The Element explores a range of strategies for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate value influences. It concludes by proposing an approach for managing values in science that relies on justifying, prioritising, and implementing norms for scientific research practices and institutions.

References

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