Like most lawyers, I first came across the doctrine of vicarious liability in tort as a student. I found it somewhat of an oddity: a principle of strict liability in an area of law dominated by fault, notably the tort of negligence. Vicarious liability seemed to be the cuckoo in the nest; imposing liability without fault on innocent parties (usually employers) regardless of their attempts to exercise reasonable care. I soon learnt that whilst the doctrine was regarded as an indispensable element of the law of torts, my textbooks could provide no clear rationale for its existence and that, in practice, uncertainty seemed to arise at each stage of its operation: was there a relationship giving rise to vicarious liability? What connection had to exist between the employee's (it is in most cases the employee) misconduct and the job he was supposed to perform? Frustratingly, later, as a teacher and lecturer in law, these problems continued to trouble me and, dare I say, intensified in the face of cases arising from the Supreme Courts of leading common law jurisdictions in 1999, 2001 and 2003 in which the most learned judges of each jurisdiction struggled both to provide an explanation for vicarious liability and a legal framework in which the doctrine could be applied. Further, as a comparative lawyer, I came to realise that this was not just a common law problem.