Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Part I A constructionist framework for person and self
- Part II Person and self in science
- 8 Philosophy's legacy to a science of self
- 9 Self in mind and brain
- 10 Self, person as agent and natural causation
- 11 Self in child development
- 12 Self in human evolution
- 13 Loose ends and split hairs
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Self in mind and brain
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Part I A constructionist framework for person and self
- Part II Person and self in science
- 8 Philosophy's legacy to a science of self
- 9 Self in mind and brain
- 10 Self, person as agent and natural causation
- 11 Self in child development
- 12 Self in human evolution
- 13 Loose ends and split hairs
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Given that ‘the mind’ is typically seen as a product of the brain, self has also become an important topic within neuroscience. It is, of course, vital to explore how brain activity relates to activities such as attention, perception and memory that are traditionally associated with mental processes. As parts of the biological organism, the brain and nervous system can be regarded as functioning in a similar way across all human beings, and there is an understandable tendency to assign to the brain the function of general coordination and control, a function that is similarly accorded to the notion of a self. I will argue that the equation between brain and mind has been made without sufficient regard for personal and supra-personal levels of explanation. Cultural variation in mind or self may be acknowledged, but the clear preference within neuroscience is to look for the sources of this variation in universal mechanisms of the brain.
As I made clear in Chapter 1, I am not setting out to preserve a certain level of phenomena (culture, norms, reasons, etc.) from the reach of natural explanation. My criticisms are directed at a tendency to confuse explanations at different levels or a failure to recognise that explanations are needed that interpenetrate different levels. As regards neuroscience, I attribute these failings mainly to the influence of Cartesian assumptions, and I will outline an alternative foundation that is heavily indebted to Wittgenstein.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Virtual Selves, Real PersonsA Dialogue across Disciplines, pp. 159 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009