In the previous chapter, I argued that Aristotle thinks that it is impossible to have one ethical virtue fully without having the rest, because ethical virtue involves reason (it is meta logou) and so the reason and feelings of the good person are completely integrated. One might therefore expect the good human being to be free of inner conflict and regret, and that is exactly how Aristotle describes him (EN IX 4 1166a27–29). Indeed, according to Aristotle, the good person will feel neither shame nor disgrace because he will never voluntarily perform base actions (EN IV 9 1128b20–33). One might also expect it to be impossible for the demands of one virtue to conflict with the demands of another, and indeed, consistently with that view, the author of the Magna Moralia writes that the demands of bravery cannot conflict with those of justice, even in particular circumstances (MM II 3 1199b35–1200a). It is reasonable to assume that the ethical virtues are meant to be internally consistent as well.

All of these further claims make Aristotle's view about the unity of the ethical virtues even more controversial from both an ancient and modern point of view. It is often thought that the Greek tragedians show how life contains situations where even the good human being is faced with a tragic dilemma and must do something that is not virtuous and that will shatter her fragile goodness. It is also argued that there are situations where the good person is faced with conflicting demands and where, even if he makes the right choice, he will have done something shameful and will be left with “dirty hands” and a special sort of regret.