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16 - Disequilibrium features of the barter model of written pledges markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Donald A. Walker
Affiliation:
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

This chapter focuses on the behavior of the market participants in relation to the use of written pledges in Walras's barter model of written pledges markets, analyzing and evaluating the structure and functioning of the model. The structural features of the model are shown to make it impossible for it to have equilibrating processes. The model is incomplete because the participants do not express their demands for consumer commodities, capital goods, or productive services. Even if the model is arbitrarily assumed to reach a set of equilibrium prices, there would be further insurmountable equilibrating problems because of the difficulties of distributing the pledges to consumers and producers and of arranging fulfillment of the pledges.

Introduction

This chapter concludes the explanation and evaluation of Walras's barter model of written pledges markets. Many matters that have not been discussed elsewhere in the interpretive literature are analyzed, and it is shown that the model has a number of logical deficiencies that have not previously been recognized, as far as I am aware. The behavior of the market participants in relation to the use of written pledges is explained, showing how Walras wanted the exchanges of products and services to be effectuated. Then the consequences of his assumptions are examined in regard to the equilibrating behavior of the model after an equilibrium set of prices is assumed to be found. It is shown how structural features of the model and the market procedures assumed by Walras are insufficient to result in the occurrence of equilibrating processes in the model.

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Chapter
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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