Each side in this war tried to profit by the other's dissensions at home. Among the tasks set Shovell in the Mediterranean in 1703 was the landing of arms and money for the rebel Cévenols; and in 1706 the Main Fleet stayed at home all the summer making ready to descend on the Biscay shore with substantial forces of English and Dutch troops, several regiments of French Protestants under Jean Cavalier, and 10,000 muskets for the insurgents. In the same way France tried to make capital out of the tangled politics of Great Britain and the dislike Scots and English had in those days for one another, even after the Act of Union. None of these projects came to anything. Shovell failed to gain touch with Cevenol agents in the Mediterranean: the great descent of 1706 got no farther than Torbay. But the French attempt in 1708 very nearly succeeded in its first object at any rate—to land the Queen of England's brother and proclaim him King James VIII in Scotland with the help of French bayonets.

Before deciding upon the enterprise, France took some pains to feel her way. In the years between 1705 and 1708, King Louis corresponded with Jacobite or seeming-Jacobite leaders in Scotland; conspirators in France, such as Charles Fleming and Nathaniel Hooke, devised plans of invasion or went to Scotland to arrange ways and means; the Chevalier de Nangis, afterwards a captain in the Dunkirk squadron and commander of Le Salisbury in the expedition, was sent to see through French eyes how the land lay and to check the reports of Jacobite enthusiasts.