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7 - Thoughts on Red Teaming

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2011

Williamson Murray
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
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Summary

In the twenty-first century, the United States and its allies will confront a number of disparate challenges. Enemies will prove adaptive and effective in preparing their military forces to attack, disturb, disorient, and prevent the projection of U.S. military power onto their territory and to deny the United States political and strategic victory. Moreover, they will undoubtedly fight within diverse strategic, operational, and tactical frameworks – frameworks largely determined by their societal, religious, and political cultures, all differing from those of the United States and its allies. America's potential opponents are already preparing to fight the U.S. military and, over the past decade, they have had two spectacular demonstrations of what its forces can do. The great difficulty for the armed forces of the United States lies in the fact that at present – and for the foreseeable future – they confront enormous ambiguity and uncertainty about their potential enemies; the conditions under which war will occur; as well as the staying power, military capabilities, and operational courses potential opponents might employ.

The question, then, that confronts the U.S. military is how to prepare forces to fight against opponents, the nature and aims of which are at present unclear. However much one might be tempted to prepare those forces on the basis of capabilities, such an approach will inevitably lead to mirror imaging. Thus, it would seem that red teaming U.S. forces and concepts from the highest to lowest levels represents the best alternative to learning on the battlefield, where military organizations learn by killing their own. This paper will use the term red teaming to mean the willingness to establish independent teams or other means to challenge the assumptions and preconceptions that military organizations often make. Such teams demand independent, perceptive officers and players unhindered by the strictures and mindsets of service cultures and bureaucratic restraints. War games, exercises, and maneuvers that prepare military forces for the future must involve red forces and red teams that can utilize asymmetric approaches, operational concepts, and tactics to challenge the plans and concepts of America's military. If they do not, they simply become one more method of validating the status quo, and historically the price paid for such an approach has been in blood and national treasure.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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  • Thoughts on Red Teaming
  • Williamson Murray, Ohio State University
  • Book: War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511996252.008
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  • Thoughts on Red Teaming
  • Williamson Murray, Ohio State University
  • Book: War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511996252.008
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Thoughts on Red Teaming
  • Williamson Murray, Ohio State University
  • Book: War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511996252.008
Available formats
×