Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Weber, Habermas, and transformations of the European state
- 1 Introduction: Theorizing Modern Transformations of Law and Democracy
- 2 The Historical Logic(s) of Habermas's Critique of Weber's “Sociology of Law”
- 3 The Puzzle of Law, Democracy, and Historical Change in Weber's “Sociology of Law”
- 4 Habermas's Deliberatively Legal Sozialstaat: Democracy, Adjudication, and Reflexive Law
- 5 Habermas on the EU: Normative Aspirations, Empirical Questions, and Historical Assumptions
- 6 The Structural Transformation to the Supranational Sektoralstaat and Prospects for Democracy in the EU
- 7 Conclusion: Habermas's Philosophy of History and Europe's Future
- Index
2 - The Historical Logic(s) of Habermas's Critique of Weber's “Sociology of Law”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Weber, Habermas, and transformations of the European state
- 1 Introduction: Theorizing Modern Transformations of Law and Democracy
- 2 The Historical Logic(s) of Habermas's Critique of Weber's “Sociology of Law”
- 3 The Puzzle of Law, Democracy, and Historical Change in Weber's “Sociology of Law”
- 4 Habermas's Deliberatively Legal Sozialstaat: Democracy, Adjudication, and Reflexive Law
- 5 Habermas on the EU: Normative Aspirations, Empirical Questions, and Historical Assumptions
- 6 The Structural Transformation to the Supranational Sektoralstaat and Prospects for Democracy in the EU
- 7 Conclusion: Habermas's Philosophy of History and Europe's Future
- Index
Summary
Max Weber's “Sociology of Law” holds a peculiar place in German history and legal philosophy. Systematically, it is the most elaborate and influential analysis of the possibility of realizing political legitimacy through legal procedures. But, historically, SL is often read as a testament to the failure or impossibility of liberal democracy's ability to secure substantive legitimacy through the law. Weber suggested that rational-legal authority is legitimate because subjects comply with the law on the basis of its rationality or logical consistency, best exemplified by parliamentary government. This form of legitimacy is superior to traditional authority, which is undergirded by force of habit, or charismatic authority, which is based on ecstatic devotion, or any form of authority that is supported by the mere threat of violent sanction. However, in his practical political writings from roughly the same era, Weber ascribed superior democratic legitimacy to a directly elected president over the legislature in the emerging Weimar Republic. According to some scholars, Weber's theoretical underspecification of rational-legal legitimacy, his skeptical practical prescriptions concerning parliament and law, and the subsequent consequences for Germany's first attempt at constitutional democracy are not coincidentally related. I will offer my own account of the relationship of Weber's sociology of law and the Weimar context of a fragile constitutional-social democracy in the next chapter.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Weber, Habermas and Transformations of the European StateConstitutional, Social, and Supranational Democracy, pp. 27 - 69Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007