George Chahsenah, a member of the Comanche Nation, died on October 11, 1963. His sole heir was an estranged, illegitimate daughter who, according to his will, had “shown no interest in” him. Therefore, Chahsenah bequeathed his entire estate to his niece and her three children, with whom he had lived for many years before his death. However, because his estate consisted of three Comanche allotments, US law required the secretary of the interior to approve the inheritance. Chahsenah's daughter challenged the will, arguing that her father had suffered from chronic alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, and diabetes, rendering him incompetent.

An examiner of inheritance for the Department of the Interior determined that the will was properly executed, witness statements showed that Chahsenah possessed testamentary capacity, and Chahsenah's failure to provide for his daughter was not unnatural since there had been no close relationship. However, the regional solicitor, acting for the secretary of the interior, set aside the examiner's action and ordered distribution to the daughter. Chahsenah's niece brought suit in the District Court, contending that the regional solicitor's action exceeded his authority. The District Court ruled for the niece, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the secretary's action was unreviewable. On appeal, the US Supreme Court sided with the niece and reversed the secretary's action in Tooahnippah v. Hickel. After the Court's conference, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger assigned the majority opinion to himself.

Justice John Marshall Harlan II thought Tooahnippah was a “peewee” case – his term for insignificant matters that reached the High Court – but he disagreed with the secretary of the interior's “high-handed paternalism” and voted with the majority to reverse the court of appeals. Harlan expected the chief justice to produce an opinion ordering the secretary to approve Chahsenah's will and distribute the inheritance to the niece, but he was disappointed with the first draft Burger circulated. Instead of fully resolving the case, Burger had restricted the opinion to the question of whether federal courts had the power to review the secretary's order.