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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

James W. Garson
James W. Garson
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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What Logics Mean
From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics
 , pp. 275 - 279
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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  • References
  • James W. Garson, University of Houston
  • Book: What Logics Mean
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461.019
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  • References
  • James W. Garson, University of Houston
  • Book: What Logics Mean
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461.019
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • References
  • James W. Garson, University of Houston
  • Book: What Logics Mean
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856461.019
Available formats
×