Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 A Corporate Vision: Business as Development Philosophy
- 2 The Butwal Technical Institute, Tinau, and the Origins of the Butwal Power Company
- 3 Andhi Khola
- 4 Jhimruk
- 5 The “Great Upheaval”: Khimti and the Limits of the Hoftun Hydropower Vision
- 6 Melamchi and the Rush to Privatization
- 7 Privatization: The Long Haul
- 8 The New BPC: Cultures in Conflict
- 9 Conclusion: From Seed, to Plant, to Seed
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
7 - Privatization: The Long Haul
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2022
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 A Corporate Vision: Business as Development Philosophy
- 2 The Butwal Technical Institute, Tinau, and the Origins of the Butwal Power Company
- 3 Andhi Khola
- 4 Jhimruk
- 5 The “Great Upheaval”: Khimti and the Limits of the Hoftun Hydropower Vision
- 6 Melamchi and the Rush to Privatization
- 7 Privatization: The Long Haul
- 8 The New BPC: Cultures in Conflict
- 9 Conclusion: From Seed, to Plant, to Seed
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Summary
You may say one thing more: Mr. Hoftun is not going to give up.
—Odd Hoftun to Balaram Pradhan, January 28, 2000The Butwal Power Company (BPC) privatization process went through four rounds of bidding. The Nepal government canceled the first two rounds officially on the grounds that the bids were too low. But, as we have seen, there were many other complicating factors including negotiations surrounding the Melamchi project and active obstructionism on the part of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and the BPC administration itself, both of whom feared that the company's privatization would threaten their authority and even their jobs. Adding to the climate of dysfunction was the general state of chaos that had enveloped Nepal during the People's War when the government was in constant flux and bandhs (public strikes) and bombings became almost routine threats to daily existence.
The third and fourth rounds of bidding turned out to be very different from the first two. Whereas the earlier rounds had seen significant international interest in purchasing BPC, by the last two rounds virtually no foreign bidders remained. A company that had earlier been portrayed as a promising international investment opportunity had, from a Western perspective, turned into a third-world albatross. Ironically, as foreign interest dwindled, Nepali investors stepped into the gap to finance almost the entire bid.
Looking back, perhaps the most astonishing thing about the entire process—beyond the ongoing obstructionism and chaos in which it unfolded—was the sheer determination of the bidders. Both the Interkraft consortium and the Chaudhary Group held out till the bitter end in what looked like a war of attrition, or an ultramarathon that few mortals could have succeeded in finishing. By the time it was over Odd Hoftun was emotionally and physically exhausted and Balaram Pradhan had, literally, worked himself almost to death.
In the weeks following the second bid's cancellation, in January 2000 Hoftun and Pradhan reflected on where they had been and where they were going. Both sensed that even the limited Norwegian public-sector commercial interest that BPC had attracted in the first rounds would not continue into the third. Although it added a great deal of stress to the prospects of financing the remaining bids, in a way this stripping away of foreign commercial involvement was liberating for Hoftun and Pradhan.
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- Information
- What Went RightSustainability Versus Dependence in Nepal's Hydropower Development, pp. 194 - 229Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022