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18 - The normative bias of the Walrasian model: Walras versus Gossen (1977)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Donald A. Walker
Affiliation:
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

Though Walras's Eléments d'économie politique pure is couched in the language of pure theory and appears, on the surface, as a completely wert-frei synoptic view of the interdependent operations of an economic system under a hypothetical regime of perfectly free competition, nevertheless the implicit moral convictions that inform the model occasionally show through—nowhere better than in Walras's theorem of maximum social satisfaction. I propose, therefore, to concentrate my attention on that theorem: showing in the first part how, for want of proper attention to Walras's moral bias, the theorem came to be misunderstood by Walras's most eminent critics, and, in the second part, how this bias was brought out into the open in Walras's analysis of Gossen's theory of maximum subjective gain from trade.

A common complaint against Léon Walras is that he misconceived the maximization of social satisfaction. A good example of this complaint appears in William Baumol's Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, where we are told:

One of the most unfortunate bits of circular reasoning in the history of the discussion of our problem is found throughout Léon Walras's otherwise invaluable works. … [His] argument is the standard one, that given the price of any two commodities, the best any consumer can do for himself is to buy these commodities in such proportion that the ratio between their marginal utilities to him is equal to the ratio of their prices. […]

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1983

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