The past decade has ushered in enormous changes in the way in which adult development is construed, particularly in the area of adult cognitive development (e.g., Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Berg & Sternberg, 1985; Cavanaugh & Morton, 1989; Labouvie-Vief, 1981; Labouvie-Vief & Chandler, 1977; Poon, 1985; Sinnott, 1989). Traditional models of aging, which were derived from child-centered conceptions, often stress, at best, stability or, more often, regression in developmental trajectories and have failed to take into account adaptive forms of intelligence in later life. Some of the models that challenge tradition favor contextualism (e.g., Baltes et al., 1984; Berg & Sternberg, 1985; Cavanaugh & Morton, 1989; Poon, 1985), whereas others favor organicism (Kramer, 1989a; Labouvie-Vief, 1981).

The issues surrounding the controversy about whether organicism or contextualism is the preferable model are many and lie beyond the scope of the present chapter (see Dixon, Kramer, & Baltes, 1985; Kahlbaugh, 1989; Kramer, 1987a; Kramer & Bopp, 1989; Labouvie-Vief, 1981; Lerner & Kauffman, 1985; Meacham, 1989; Overton, 1984). However, these models share a united concern that traditional, mechanistic models have failed to take into account the varied and multiple contexts in which development occurs, including the sociohistorical context, the individual's meaning-making activities and goals, the relationship context, or the developmental context (Kramer & Bopp, 1989). Not surprisingly, then, mechanistic models have traditionally resulted in decline or, at best, stability representations of cognitive aging processes. Contextualist and organismic models are more likely to foster growth conceptions (Kramer, 1987b).