This chapter explores the connections between hinge epistemology and relativism, with special attention to epistemic relativism. It considers the issue both from a historical and a systematic dimension. Concerning the former, it looks at whether Wittgenstein's On Certainty (OC) lends itself to relativistic interpretations. Concerning the latter, in contrast, it considers contemporary versions of hinge epistemology, with special emphasis on Coliva's (2015).

Wittgenstein's OC and Relativism

Different assessments and developments of Wittgensteinian themeso ften depend on dissimilar readings of On Certainty. On “framework” readings of OC (McGinn 1989, Wright 1985, Moyal-Sharrock 2004, Coliva 2010a, Pritchard 2015, Schönbaumsfeld 2017), hinges are not like ordinary empirical propositions, but more like rules. According to epistemic readings of OC (Morawetz 1978, Pritchard 2001, 2011 Williams 2004a, b, Wright 2004, Kusch 2016a), hinges may be non-evidentially justified and might even become the object of knowledge, if knowledge extends to propositions for which we do not possess evidential justifications.According to naturalistic readings (Strawson 1985 but see also Stroll 1994 and Moyal-Sharrock 2004), hinges are propositions we believe because of our upbringing within a community that endorses them and are thus “second nature” to us. Finally, according to therapeutic readings (drawing on Conant 1998, see Crary 2005, Maddy 2017), OC contains no theory of hinges at all. Rather, its aim is to cure us from the kind of intellectual cramp that makes us think we could sensibly doubt them.

These different interpretations of OC have led to different positions about the allegedly relativistic implications of that work. Clearly, if there is nothing substantive to be said about the status of hinges, they might vary for different people, but this would not by itself lend support to any relativistic view. Naturalistic readings could be more hospitable to relativism, since “second nature” is a culturally inherited trait. Insofar as different cultures may pass on different hinges and yet may be on a par, a form of relativism would become more readily available. Yet, it is notable that no supporter of a naturalistic reading of OC has proposed a relativistic interpretation of it. This is largely because they have focused on universal hinges like “There are physical objects,”