Relativists and anti-relativists alike are nowadays mostly united in considering Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist.Accordingly,there could be, either in principle or as a matter of fact, different epistemic systems, none of which would be intrinsically correct; each of them would be, from a metaphysical point of view, as good as any other one, and would certify as (true and) justified different propositions. As a consequence, knowledge—that is, justified true belief—, if and when attained, would always be situated: what counts as knowledge within one system of justification may not be so within another. Moreover, should alternative epistemic systems compete with each other, the choice couldn't be based on rational considerations, for it is only within each system that reasons and justifications are produced. Hence, the passage from one epistemic system to another would always be a form of conversion or persuasion, reached through a-rational means.

Relativist readings of Wittgenstein's thought base their interpretation mostly on his claim, in On Certainty (1969), that at the foundations of our language games and, in particular, of our epistemic ones—those in which we provide reasons for and against certain propositions or theories, and are interested in assessing their truth—lie propositions which are neither true nor false; grounded or ungrounded; rational or irrational (OC 93–99, 110, 130, 166, 196–206, 222, 307, 499, 559; Wittgenstein 1974). If, however, our language games are neither supported by grounds nor can be said to be true, they can't be rationally held and it would be possible, at least de jure, to have alternative ones, which would be as legitimate as ours. Hence, it would be possible, at least in principle, to have different world-pictures (Weltbilder) (OC 93–97, 162, 167, 233, 262).

Before going on, a warning is necessary though. World-picture (Weltbild) is a vague notion and comprises many different elements, such as methods of inquiry—that is, ways of forming, connecting and justifying beliefs, like observation, induction, deduction and all other reasoning procedures—, theories—mathematical and scientific ones as well as history, geography, geology, archaeology, etc.—and even propositions—“There is an external material world,” “I am not now dreaming,” “Here's my hand,” “My name is NN,” “The Earth has existed for a long time,” “Water boils at 100 °C,” “Nobody has ever been on the Moon,” etc.