Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Works by Wittgenstein
- Chapter One Wittgenstein on Certainty
- Chapter Two The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism about Other Minds
- Chapter Three The Everyday Alternative to Scepticism: Cavell and Wittgenstein on Other Minds
- Chapter Four Wittgenstein and Knowledge
- Chapter Five Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing
- Chapter Six Wittgenstein and Moore’s Paradox
- Chapter Seven Wittgenstein and Naturalism
- Chapter Eight Naturalism and ‘Turning Our Whole Inquiry Around’
- Chapter Nine Liberal Naturalism: Wittgenstein and McDowell
- Chapter Ten ‘Recognizing the Ground That Lies before Us as Ground’: McDowell on How to Read the Philosophical Investigations
- Chapter Eleven Grammar in the Philosophical Investigations
- References
- Index
Chapter Five - Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Works by Wittgenstein
- Chapter One Wittgenstein on Certainty
- Chapter Two The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism about Other Minds
- Chapter Three The Everyday Alternative to Scepticism: Cavell and Wittgenstein on Other Minds
- Chapter Four Wittgenstein and Knowledge
- Chapter Five Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing
- Chapter Six Wittgenstein and Moore’s Paradox
- Chapter Seven Wittgenstein and Naturalism
- Chapter Eight Naturalism and ‘Turning Our Whole Inquiry Around’
- Chapter Nine Liberal Naturalism: Wittgenstein and McDowell
- Chapter Ten ‘Recognizing the Ground That Lies before Us as Ground’: McDowell on How to Read the Philosophical Investigations
- Chapter Eleven Grammar in the Philosophical Investigations
- References
- Index
Summary
1. One of the central claims in Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits is that ‘knowing is a state of mind’ (Williamson 2002: 21). He writes:
There is a mental state of believing that it is raining, and there is – on the present account – a mental state of knowing that it is raining, but there is no intermediate mental state of believing truly that it is raining. (27)
The view that Williamson here expresses appears to be the direct opposite of the one expressed by Wittgenstein in the following remarks from OC:
One can say ‘He believes it, but it isn't so’, but not ‘He knows it, but it isn't so’. Does this stem from the difference between the mental states of belief and knowledge? No. – One may for example call ‘mental state’ what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures, etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. (OC §42)
We are asking ourselves: what we do with a statement ‘I know …’? For it is not a question of mental processes or mental states. (OC §230)
There is, however, a question whether in claiming that knowing is a mental state Williamson is affirming the view that Wittgenstein is denying when he asserts that it is not one. The apparent opposition is real only if what Williamson is claiming about knowing in calling it a mental state is what Wittgenstein means to deny in claiming it is not. And until we know what each of them means in claiming, or denying, that knowing is a mental state, the conclusion that they are disagreeing about the truth of a single thesis is premature. In this chapter, I want to look more carefully at what each of the above claims amounts to and thereby try to clarify the extent, if any, to which Williamson and Wittgenstein are in disagreement.
2. One of the things that Williamson means to assert in claiming that knowing is a mental state is that the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief is incorrect.
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- Wittgenstein, Scepticism and NaturalismEssays on the Later Philosophy, pp. 63 - 78Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2021