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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Religion

Ontological Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2020

Tyron Goldschmidt
Tyron Goldschmidt
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University, North Carolina

Summary

Proving the existence of God is a perennial philosophical ambition. An armchair proof would be the jackpot. Ontological arguments promise as much. This Element studies the most famous ontological arguments from Anselm, Descartes, Plantinga, and others besides. While the verdict is that ontological arguments don't work, they get us entangled in fun philosophical puzzles, from philosophy of religion to philosophy of language, from metaphysics to ethics, and beyond.
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Keywords

ontological argumentsGodphilosophy of religionmetaphysics
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Religion
Online ISBN: 9781108686990
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 03 December 2020

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Ontological Arguments
  • Tyron Goldschmidt, Wake Forest University, North Carolina
  • Online ISBN: 9781108686990
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Ontological Arguments
  • Tyron Goldschmidt, Wake Forest University, North Carolina
  • Online ISBN: 9781108686990
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Ontological Arguments
  • Tyron Goldschmidt, Wake Forest University, North Carolina
  • Online ISBN: 9781108686990
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